




Venture capitalists are a major source of funding for start-up firms.' As
a general matter, entrepreneurs find it difficult to borrow money from banks
or sell shares directly to the public until they have finished their innovation
and acquired a sufficiently large market share.2 Venture capitalists bridge
this gap by acting as financial intermediaries: they raise capital from
investors, such as large institutions, and use it to identify, finance and
monitor entrepreneurs with promising innovations.3 In return for its
investment, a venture capitalist receives equity in the start-up and myriad
other contractual rights. These rights are set forth in a series of complex
contracts between the entrepreneur and venture capitalist (collectively,
"venture-capital contracts"). These contracts include a number of
provisions meant to reduce the opportunistic behavior of entrepreneurs by
exposing them to high-powered incentives and giving the venture capitalist
control over the start-up, including the power to fire entrepreneurs and
dilute their equity holdings.
4
The venture-capital literature has explained these one-sided features of
venture-capital contracts as rational, well-tailored reactions to informational
Charles W. Ehrhardt Professor, Florida State University College of Law.See DOUGLAS J. CUMMING & SOFIA A. JOHAN, VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE
EQUITY CONTRACTING: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 32-44 (2009) (providing
an overview of the literature).
2 See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of
Capital Markets. Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243 (1998).Financial intermediaries help facilitate exchanges between parties with different
transactional information, liquidity preferences, tolerance for risk and abilities to
hedge. Not all institutions provide clients with the full menu of intermediation
services, but modem intermediaries have become more homogeneous, a product of
increased competition brought about by deregulation. See XAVIER FREIXAS &
JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET, MICROECONOMICS OF BANKING 15 (1997) (defining a
"financial intermediary" as a financial institution that "specializes in. .. buying
and selling (at the same time) financial contracts and securities" and is in the
business of transforming financial inputs into outputs); Robert C. Merton, A
Functional Perspective of Financial Intermediation, 24 FN. MGMT. 23, 24-28
(1995) (describing the various roles of financial intermediaries, including designing
and facilitating transactions in financial securities that are not amenable for trading
in organized markets due to transaction costs and informational asymmetries).
4 See William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital
Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 506 (1990) (arguing that venture capitalists
"structure their investments so as to keep firm control").
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asymmetries faced by venture capitalists.5 But shifting ex post bargaining
power so drastically in favor of venture capitalists has an unfortunate side
effect: it provides them with great leeway to act opportunistically at the
entrepreneur's expense. Opportunistic behavior creates deadweight losses
for society. From a social-welfare-maximizing perspective, the optimal
contract would reduce the sum of the welfare losses from the opportunism
of both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. While our understanding of
venture-capital contracts has increased greatly in the last twenty years, we
still do not have a sufficiently good grasp of how to accomplish this.
This Article examines the dynamics of this fundamental tradeoff
between entrepreneurial and venture-capitalist opportunism. It shows that
standard venture-capital contracts tip the scales in favor of venture-
capitalist opportunism, but leave open the possibility for self-preserving
strategic behavior by entrepreneurs that can reduce the joint welfare of both
parties. It also identifies a number of factors that make it difficult for
venture capitalists to modify the standard contracts in order to reduce these
welfare losses.
Part II provides an overview of entrepreneurial opportunism and the
way that standard venture-capital contracts deal with the problem. Part III
examines some of the unintended side effects of the high-powered
incentives used by venture capitalists. Part IV identifies various roadblocks
to the emergence of optimal venture-capital contracts. Part V discusses
various ways in which legal rules can help reduce the misincentives created
by standard venture capital contacts. Part VI concludes.
II. CONTRACTS BETWEEN ENTREPRENEURS AND
VENTURE CAPITALISTS
Whenever one individual acts on behalf of another, a potential agency
problem arises: the agent-the person acting-will undoubtedly have
interests incongruous with those of her principal. All things being equal,
one would expect that a bona fide, self-interested agent will act in a self-
serving manner. 6 When a venture capitalist invests in a start-up, it "hires"
the entrepreneur to act as its agent, instructing her to use the invested funds
to finish and market the innovation within a set time period. The venture
capitalist wants to be able to harvest its investment or, if things are not
progressing well, to liquidate the firm, in both instances, sooner rather than
5 See Paul Gompers, Venture Capital, in HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE 483,
494 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007) [hereinafter Venture Capital] (arguing that venture
capital can provide the most value by investing in start-up firms where
informational asymmetry problems are particularly acute).
6 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Principal and Agent, in THE NEW PALGRAVE:
ALLOCATION, INFORMATION, AND MARKETS 241, 241-42 (John Eatwell et al. eds.,
1 st ed. 1989) (discussing the sources of agency problems and various approaches
available to try to reduce agency costs).
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later. On the other hand, entrepreneurs often prefer a slower, more
deliberate pace, particularly if it requires them to exert less effort or yields a
higher expected return in the long-run, and for the firm to continue in
existence even if it is performing poorly. A venture capitalist, like any other
principal, will want to identify these agency risks and ways of dealing with
them. As we will now see, venture-capital contracts are usually explained
as a reaction to the special agency problems faced by investors in
innovation-intensive start-ups.
A. Agency Risks Faced By Venture Capitalists
There are two principal reasons why investments in innovation-
intensive start-ups are particularly risky: the uncertainty surrounding the
innovation process and risks associated with the intangible nature of
innovations7; and the general informational asymmetry between an
entrepreneur and a venture capitalist.
1. The Nature of Start- Ups
New ventures are by nature risky, and both those within and outside the
firm will often be uncertain about its actual prospects, including whether it
will be able to attract customers and investors. Innovation-intensive firms
are even riskier. This is due in part to uncertainties surrounding the
technical viability and market potential of innovations and whether
competitors will vie for a share of the new market.8 Moreover, the principal
assets of these firms are intangible in nature--e.g., the entrepreneur's
human capital and intellectual property, such as patents and trade secrets.
As a general matter, firms with tangible assets pose fewer risks to
investors. Tangible assets, such as manufacturing equipment, provide
investors who control the firm with bargaining power over the entrepreneur,
whose access to the assets is subject to the investors' continuing consent.9
Such assets are also easier to value and sell than intellectual property and
other types of intangible assets. This makes it easier for the investors of a
failing firm to recuperate some of their investment by taking possession of
the assets. Finally, to the extent that a firm's fortunes are intricately tied to
an employee's human capital, the employee may be able to renegotiate its
contract with investors merely by threatening to quit the firm. The
magnitude of this hold-up problem will depend on the outside options
7 See PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 127 (1999)
(stating that young companies bringing new products to the market are inherently
risky).
8 See Bengt Holmstrom, Agency Cost and Innovation, 12 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
305, 309 (1989).
9 See OLIVER HART, FIRMs, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 56-58
(1995) (arguing that the ownership of tangible assets helps reduce the hold-up risks
posed by employees threatening to quit a venture).
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available to the employee and the extent to which the venture has
transformed that human capital into sellable assets, such as intellectual
property, goodwill and actual tangible assets. 10
2. The Informational Asymmetry Problem
An entrepreneur trying to attract investors faces an adverse selection
problem, given that she has private information about the true value of the
venture, including the viability of the innovation and the skills and
industriousness she will bring to bear once the investors are on board.
Knowing that they lack such information, investors will discount for the
risk that they are buying into a "lemon."" This discounting hurts "good"
entrepreneurs. 12 If "good" entrepreneurs are unable to credibly
communicate their private information,'13 they will either cross-subsidize
"bad" entrepreneurs, or, if the discount is too great, have to generate the
funds internally 14 or pass-up valuable projects. 5
Even if an entrepreneur is able to attract investors, the parties still have
to address a second informational asymmetry problem, known as "moral
hazard." 16 Since a venture capitalist is not involved in the day-to-day
managing of the venture, it will not have first-hand knowledge of how
1o See Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L.
& ECON. 297 (1978).
11 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons ": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970) (setting forth standard treatment of
adverse selection problem in context of used car dealers, which have informational
advantage over potential purchases of "lemons").
12 Good firms raise capital to finance valuable projects or for other well-founded
business reasons; bad firms raise capital to take advantage of potential investors,
either because the firm is overvalued or the insiders are engaged in self-dealing.
See JEAN TiROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 237 (2006) (discussing
roOd and bad reasons why firms seek outside funding).
To achieve this, "good" entrepreneurs must be able to send a signal that cannot
be mimicked by "bad" entrepreneurs. See Raphael Amit, Lawrence Glosten &
Eitan Muller, Entrepreneurial Ability, Venture Investments, and Risk Sharing, 36
MGMT. SCI. 1232 (1990) (setting forth an adverse selection model in the context of
venture capital financing).
14 Given the adverse selection problem firms will often resort to a pecking order
when deciding how to finance a project-first relying on internal financing, then on
debt and finally on equity. Debt is preferred to equity since it has priority; thus, all
other things being equal, a debtholder who invests in an overvalued firm is harmed
less than an equityholder. See Stewart C. Myers, The Capital Structure Puzzle, 39
J. FIN. 575 (1984).15 See TIROLE, supra note 12, at 242-44 (discussing cases in which a good firm will
agree to cross-subsidize and those in which it will abandon trying to raise external
funds to finance a project).16 See PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT 166-67 (1992).
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much time and effort the entrepreneur is dedicating to the venture.' 7 This in
turn will make it easier for entrepreneurs to engage in self-dealing and other
types of opportunistic behavior. As a general matter, the moral hazard
problem will be more severe in technology intensive firms, given that even
if investors are able to observe an entrepreneur, they may not have the
requisite technical knowledge to determine whether her actions are in the
best interests of the firm. 8
3. The General Contracting Problem Faced by Venture Capitalists
One role of financial intermediaries, such as venture capitalists, is to act
as agents for investors who do not have the requisite expertise to screen
investments and manage the moral hazard problem.' 9 We will be primarily
concerned with the way that venture-capital contracts deal with the moral
hazard posed by entrepreneurs. Given the informational asymmetry
problem described above, the venture capitalist will be unable to fully
discern whether the start-up's performance is due to the actions of the
entrepreneur or factors beyond her control. It is reasonable to assume that
the entrepreneur is risk-averse and thus prefers a certain return to a random
one, which is equivalent to saying that she will discount any portion of her
compensation that depends on random shocks due to factors beyond her
control. As a result, a venture capitalist faces the following problem:
designing a contract that provides the entrepreneur with a sufficiently high
expected return so that it exceeds (or is at least as good as) that of her other
employment options, while at the same time giving her the incentive to
exert the proper amount of effort.2°
One way of dealing with the entrepreneur's risk-averseness is to pay
her a fixed amount, regardless of the outcome; however, given the general
inability of observing the entrepreneur's effort, such a compensation
scheme will undercut her incentive to do anything. On the other hand,
making the entrepreneur's compensation completely dependent on the
observed output will provide maximum incentive, but at a price-the
17 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 7, at 130-31 (discussing the moral hazard
problem in venture-capital-financed firms); CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 1
(discussing moral hazard and adverse selection problems in venture-capital
financing); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305
1976) (discussing monitoring costs in principal-agent relationships).
See Venture Capital, supra note 5 (discussing value provided by venture
capitalists, given large informational uncertainty in high-tech start-ups).
'
9 See Sudipto Bhattacharya et al., Monitoring by and of Banks: A Discussion, in
CREDIT, INTERMEDIATION, AND THE MACROECONOMY: MODELS AND
PERSPECTIVES 122, 122 (Sudipto Bhattacharya et al. eds., 2004) (stating that
financial intermediaries are able to avoid duplicative screening).20 See MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 214-15 (describing the general
problem of designing an incentive contract when a principal cannot fully observe
the agent's level of effort).
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entrepreneur will discount the uncertain compensation and thus require a
greater amount in return for bearing all of the risk associated with outside
shocks. The venture capitalist will thus have to trade off the added benefit
from eliciting a greater amount of effort against the added compensation it
will have to pay to get the entrepreneur to agree to bear a greater amount of
risk. This risk-sharing problem is particularly important in start-ups, given
the general uncertainty surrounding innovations; in other words, the
expected returns produced by start-ups have a high variance, and thus the
risks borne by the parties will be greater. As we will now see, venture-
capital contracts make use of incentives that are very high-powered, in the
sense that they shift a large portion of the firm's risk to the entrepreneur.
B. How Venture-Capital Contracts Deal with Transactional Hazards
In order to reduce the risks associated with investing in information-
intensive start-ups, standard venture-capital contracts give ultimate control
of the firm to the venture capitalists, allow them to make their investments
in stages; and include a number of other high-powered incentives2' meant to
keep entrepreneurs on a tight contractual leash.22
1. Retaining Formal Control of the Venture
Under corporate law, corporations are managed by or under the
direction of a board of directors. Although the board does not usually run
the day-to-day affairs of a company, it is vested with the power and
responsibility of making important management decisions, including hiring
and firing managers and setting their compensation. Not surprisingly, as a
general matter, venture capitalists will negotiate to retain effective control
of the board.23 This allows them to reduce the costs of monitoring and
21 See Sahlman, supra note 4, at 506 (arguing that venture capitalists structure their
investments to keep control over the venture, use compensation schemes that
provide "appropriate incentives" to entrepreneurs, and adopt exit mechanisms to
increase the liquidity of their investments).
22 See, e.g., Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of
Venture Capital, 50 J. FIN. 1461, 1462 (1995) [hereinafter Optimal Investment]
arguing that staged financing is a way of keeping a "tight leash" on entrepreneurs).3 Even when venture capitalists do not have direct control over the board of
directors, they often retain defacto control over both the board and the venture.
See, e.g., Joseph Rosenstein et al., Do Venture Capitalists on Board Portfolio
Companies Add Value Besides Money?, in FRONTIERS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
RESEARCH 216, 220 (Robert H. Brockhaus, Jr. et al. eds. 1989). See Thomas
Hellmann, The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts, 29
RAND J. EcoN. 57, 58 (1998) ("[V]enture capitalists hold effective control over
the board, typically through a voting majority, and sometimes through explicit
contractual agreements."). When firms are already far along in the development
and marketing process at the time of investment, a venture capitalist may retain
contingent control over the board, triggered upon the occurrence of certain events,
such as the firm's failure to achieve a certain profit level, or the violation of
affirmative or negative covenants in the preferred stock agreement. See Josh
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disciplining the entrepreneur. It gives them access to corporate information
on a real-time basis, the ability to fire the entrepreneur, and the power to
intervene in micro-level management whenever they believe that the firm is
being mismanaged. Venture capitalists also retain the power to liquidate the
firm or sell it through a private sale or an initial public offering. Finally,
venture-capital contracts contain a number of provisions aimed at
restricting the managerial power of entrepreneurs, including prohibiting
them from amending the certificate of incorporation, changing the nature of
the business, entering into self-dealing transactions, making unauthorized
dividend payments, or agreeing to a merger or the sale of all or substantially
all of the firm's assets.
2. Staged Financing
Venture capitalists invest in stages, 24 which means that each time the
entrepreneur runs out of funds, she has to convince the venture capitalist to
finance an additional stage. At each juncture, the venture capitalists will
have the option to provide more capital, bring in new investors or liquidate
the company. In other words, staged financing provides venture capitalists
with a series of real options. By letting the future unfold before making a
costly-to-reverse investment, venture capitalists reduce their overall
exposure; time gives them the ability to observe the entrepreneur in action
and any progress made in finishing and marketing the innovation. But
staged financing also provides venture capitalists with great bargaining
power over the entrepreneur 25 and thus the ability to act opportunistically.
For example, venture capitalists can increase their bargaining leverage
by waiting until the firm has exhausted its working capital before agreeing
to a new round of financing. Additionally, since venture capitalists make
their investments using convertible preferred stock, the price agreed to by
the parties at each stage will affect the entrepreneur's equity stake. This is
because the preferred stock will have anti-dilution provisions that adjust the
conversion price whenever new equity is issued at a lower price. A
common type of anti-dilution provision adjusts the conversion price of all
Lemer, Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Finns, 50 J. FIN. 301,
308-10 (1995); Joseph Rosenstein et al., The CEO, Venture Capitalist, and the
Board, 8 J. Bus. VENTURING 99, 111 ("[T]he boards of high-technology portfolio
firms are small and are dominated, in terms of numbers, by venture capital
representatives .... On boards where lead investors come from the top-20 venture
capital firms, outright numerical control is characteristic.").
24 See Optimal Investment, supra note 22, at 1462 ("[T]he role of staged financing
infusion is analogous to that of debt in highly leveraged transactions, keeping the
owner/manager on a 'tight leash' and reducing potential losses from bad
decisions.").
25 See, e.g., Sahlman, supra note 4, at 506 ("[T]he most important mechanism for
controlling the venture is staging the infusion of capital.").
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of the venture capitalists' preferred stock, even if just one share is sold at a
lower price.
3. Compensation Schemes as High-Powered Incentives
Entrepreneurs receive the bulk of their compensation from stock
options and the appreciation of their original equity holdings. Venture
capitalists use stock options that vest over relatively long periods, heavily
weighted towards the back end.26 An entrepreneur who leaves the company
or is fired before her options vest loses her right to exercise them. Using
stock options with these characteristics increases the intensity of the
compensation package, since the entrepreneur will have to produce a series
of good returns before she can cash in on her efforts.
Even if the entrepreneur is able to exercise the options, she will have no
ready market to sell the shares until the venture capitalist decides to harvest
the investment, either through a private sale or an initial public offering. As
a general matter, it is difficult for non-controlling shareholders of closed
corporations to sell their shares to third parties, given that the sale will give
rise to the same type of adverse selection problem discussed above.
Additionally, under standard contracts, an entrepreneur agrees not to sell
her shares without prior consent. If she leaves the company or is fired, an
entrepreneur agrees to sell her shares to the venture capitalist at book value
rather than current market value.
There are two additional reasons why the threat of getting fired
increases the intensity of the incentive provided by venture-capital
contracts. First, at the time of the investment, the entrepreneur will transfer
the right to any innovation, including any intellectual property, to the finn,
as well as the rights in any subsequent innovations. If she is fired, she will
lose access to them. Second, an entrepreneur will also enter into non-
disclosure and non-compete agreements that will restrict her ability to seek
alternative employment.
III. SELF-PRESERVING STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND OTHER
UNINTENDED SIDE EFFECTS OF
HIGH-POWERED INCENTIVES
The high-powered incentives and control mechanisms found in
venture-capital contracts will provide entrepreneurs with important
information about the transactional risks that they face. However, some of
the relevant facts about these risks are likely to remain hidden behind
26 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 7, at 131-33 (describing the use of stock
options to align the interests of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs).
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legalese.27 Even entrepreneurs who carefully read the contracts will likely
come away with mixed signals about the true nature of the bargain.28 At the
same time, one would expect that during the venture they will become
increasingly aware of transactional risks, particularly as high-powered
incentives become binding and venture capitalists exert their power, either
legitimately or opportunistically. One would also expect that as they learn
about these risks, entrepreneurs will try to reduce them by resorting to
"self-preserving strategic behavior." The venture-capital literature has not
given sustained attention to the inefficiencies created by the self-preserving
strategic behavior of entrepreneurs.
This Part begins by providing an overview of the various sources of
potential venture capitalist opportunism. It then argues that certain
characteristics of innovation-intensive start-ups allow entrepreneurs to
engage in self-preserving strategic behavior. After doing so, the Part
examines various types of self-preserving strategic behavior available to
entrepreneurs and the social welfare repercussions.
A.. Venture Capital Opportunism
Standard venture capital contracts give venture capitalists great leeway
to act opportunistically. 29 Entrepreneurs open themselves to potential
opportunism by agreeing to transfer their intellectual property rights, invest
further in innovation-specific and venture-specific human capital, and make
the bulk of their compensation contingent on the venture's success. Once an
entrepreneur has made these transaction-specific investments, the venture
capitalists can threaten to fire her unless she agrees to give them a greater
share of.the firm's profits. What makes this threat credible is the fact that
27 See Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of Custom?
Thoughts About the Ideas of Ian Macneil And Lisa Bernstein, 94 Nw. U. L. REV.
775, 797 (2000) (arguing that "many lawyer-drafted, standard forms can only be
decoded by [ ]lawyer[s]").
28 This is due in part to the fact that venture capital contracts are very complex,
cover relatively long periods, and entrepreneurs have little experience with them.
The same type of problem arises with other long-term contracts, such as those
between franchisors and franchisees. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic
Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 47 STAN. L. REV. 927
(1990) (discussing the relational nature of long term franchise contracts and the
various repercussions of their incompleteness). On the various contracting
problems common in long-term contracts, see Victor P. Goldberg, Price
Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 527 (1985); Stewart
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
Soc. REV. 55 (1963); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term
Economic Relations Under the Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract
Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854 (1978).
29 The argument here is not that venture capitalists always act opportunistically,
only that there are various aspects of the control-incentive mechanisms in venture-
capital contracts that allow a venture capitalist to act opportunistically, if they are
so inclined.
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venture capitalists often replace entrepreneurs with professional
managers. 30 Entrepreneurs who are good at innovating do not necessarily
have the "skill set" needed to effectively manage a fast growing company in
a volatile environment. 31 Not surprisingly, venture capitalists see great
value in being able to easily fire underperforming entrepreneurs.32
30 In one study, Gorman and Sahlman asked venture capitalists how often they fired
senior management:
The answer is "Frequently." The mean (in the statistical sense)
venture capitalist has initiated the firing of three CEO/President
per 2.4 years of venture investing experience. Given that a
venture capitalist typically monitors only nine companies at a
time, and expects to hold each investment five to seven years,
this represents a noticeable high incidence of what is for all
parties a traumatic experience. It seems that clear that one of the
most significant, not to mention dramatic, things that venture
capitalists do is to evaluate management and, when they feel it to
be necessary, to dismiss a company's leadership.
Michael Gorman & William A. Sahlman, What Do Venture Capitalists Do?, 4 J.
Bus. VENTURING 231, 241 (1989). See also Jerome Doutriaux, Evolution of the
Characteristics of (High-tech) Entrepreneurial Firms, in FRONTIERS OF
ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH 368 (John A. Homaday et al. eds. 1984) (study of
Canadian high-technology firms three to eight years old, finding that about fifty
percent of them had lost at least one founder); Arnold Cooper & Albert V. Bruno,
Success Among High Technology Firms, 20 Bus. HORIz. 16, 17-18 (1977) (study
of 250 high-technology firms with multiple founders, finding that forty-eight
percent of the firms four or more years old had experienced the departure of at least
one founder); Donald C. Hambrick & Lynn M. Crozier, Stumblers and Stars in the
Management of Rapid Growth, 1 J. Bus. VENTURING 31, 44 (1985) (finding that
successful start-up firms replaced (or complemented) the owner/founder with
professional managers, and also finding that when high-growth firms "stumbled,"
founder CEOs were more likely to be heading them); Michael T. Hannan et al.,
Inertia and Change in the Early Years: Employment Relations in Young, High
Technology Firms, 5 J. INDUST. & CORP. CHANGE 503, 526-27 (1995) (study
finding that the likelihood that the founder entrepreneur will be replaced as CEO is
approximately ten percent within the first twenty months, forty percent after 3.33
years and over eighty percent after 6.5 years); Bob Zider, How Venture Capital
Works, reprinted in HARv. Bus. REv. 131, 139 (Nov.-Dec. 1998) ("[I]t is unlikely
that the founder will be the same person who takes the company public.").31 As a general matter, venture capitalists assume that entrepreneurs will be unable
to become effective managers. They refer to this presumed shortcoming of
entrepreneurs as the "founder's disease." See, e.g., MARYAM TASHAKORI,
MANAGEMENT SUCCESSION: FROM THE OWNER-FOUNDER TO THE PROFESSIONAL
PRESIDENT 25 (1980); Gorman & Sahlman, supra note 30, at 238, 242 (finding that
"venture capitalists almost uniformly attribute failures [of portfolio companies] to
shortcomings in senior management" and founders generally); Gary E. Willard et
al., In Order to Grow, Must the Founder Go: A Comparison of Performance
Between Founder and Non-Founder Managed High-Growth Manufacturing Firms,
7 J. Bus. VENTURING 181, 182 (1992).
32 See Hellmann, supra note 23, at 59 (arguing that entrepreneurs agree to grant
control to the venture capitalist in order to give it the ability to replace them with
professional managers who would increase the overall value of the firm).
2012 High-Powered (Mis)Incentives 55
and Venture-Capital Contracts
At the same time, one can make a strong argument that entrepreneurs
often enter transactions believing incorrectly that their tenure is relatively
secure. The fact that entrepreneurs agree to receive most of their
compensation through stock options provide some evidence that they
expect to remain employed at least until those options vest (if they get fired
before then, the options are cancelled).33 As the probability of being fired
increases, so does the likelihood that an entrepreneur will engage in self-
preserving strategic behavior aimed at making it costlier for the venture
capitalist to replace her.34
A second source of venture-capitalist opportunism is staged financing.35
High-tech start-ups need a steady source of capital in order to finish, test,
and bring the innovation to market. As a result, after an entrepreneur has
made transaction-specific investments, a venture capitalist can act
opportunistically by threatening not to fund any more stages or waiting to
commit to a new round until the venture's working capital is exhausted (the
"bum date"). The bargaining power provided by staged financing is further
enhanced by two other factors. First, venture capital contracts generally
give the venture capitalist a monopoly over future fifiancing and veto power
over who else can provide funds.36 Second, the pricing of new capital
infusions will determine whether the anti-dilution provisions in the venture
capitalist's preferred stock are triggered. If the price is sufficiently low, the
anti-dilution provisions can effectively wipe out an entrepreneur's whole
equity stake.37 As one commentator put it, when describing ratchet down
anti-dilution provisions:
There is no other provision so capable of changing the
initial bargain between the parties with the dramatic effect
of Full Ratchet dilution. When venture capitalists are
referred to as "vulture capitalists," it is likely the wounded
33 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 7, at 131-33.34 Firms are of course worried about potential litigation arising from dismissals.
See, e.g., Adam P. Forman, VCs Face New Risks When Discharging CEO/Minority
Shareholders (Fall 1992), http://www.tht.com/ vti bin/shtml.dll/234800.htm/map;
Robert W. Payne, Practical Advice on Selected Legal Issues for the Hi-Tech
Employer: Investigation and Termination of Employees, Ownership of Inventions,
Commissions and Trade Secret Protection, http://www.lgpatlaw.com/docs/
Pracadvc.html.
3 See Sahlman, supra note 4.Venture capitalists sometimes prevent or try to dissuade entrepreneurs from
getting outside financing even if they are not willing to fully fund the venture
themselves. See Albert A. Bruno et al., Patterns of Failure Among Silicon Valley
High Technology Firms, in FRONTIERS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH 677, 689
Paul D. Reynolds et al. eds. 1996).7 See Daniel P. Finkelman & Scott A. Birnbaum, The Risks of "Wash Out"
Financings: Avoiding Litigation Claims by Diluted Founders (Spring 1997),
http://www.tht.com/ vti bin/shtml.dll/234800.htm/map.
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founders are talking about dilutive financing and a Full
Ratchet provision.38
A third source of venture capitalist opportunism is their control over the
manner and timing of their exit from the firm. Venture capitalists retain the-
right to decide when to liquidate the venture or sell it through a private sale
or initial public offering, a contractual right meant to alleviate the risks of
investing in a firm with no active market for its stock.39 Entrepreneurs
rarely welcome a liquidation of the venture, even if it is not performing
well, since they lose their employment and the possibility of seeing their
innovation reach the market. At the same time, venture capitalists will
sometimes liquidate an otherwise viable firm, if its expected returns are not
what they (or their investors) expected,40 or not worth pursuing further,
given limited resources and the need to manage other portfolio firms.4 '
More generally, venture capitalists are wary of being stuck with the "living
dead," firms that are profitable, but not enough to allow them to be sold on
a timely basis in a private sale or public offering.42
Entrepreneurs will generally prefer an IPO to a sale to a third party.
Private sales are more likely to lead to changes in the entrepreneur's
3 8 See JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, VENTURE CAPITAL: LAW, BUSINESS STRATEGIES, AND
INVESTMENT PLANNING 176 (1988).39 See Optimal Investment, supra note 22, at 1463-64 (describing a study by
Venture Economics of returns to venture capitalists in 1988 which found that
venture capitalists who exited through IPOs received an average 59.9% per year,
that is, 7.1 times the invested capital returned over 4.2 years; venture capitalists
exiting by selling the company to a third party received average returns of only
15.4% per year (1.7 times their invested capital returned over 3.7 years); venture
capitalists who exited by liquidating the portfolio company lost eighty percent of
their value over a period of 4.1 years).
40 See, e.g., Jim Bartimo, Stoking the Micro Fire, INFOWORLD 47, 48 (Dec. 3,
1984) (attributing rush to carry out initial public offerings to the pressure of venture
capitalists who wanted to liquidate their investments in computer industry
ventures).
41 See Sahlman, supra note 4, at 507 (arguing that the "credible threat to abandon a
venture, even when the firm might be economically viable, is the key to the
relationship between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist" and stating that
while shutting down otherwise viable firms may appear to be economically
irrational, it makes perfect economic sense when viewed from the venture
capitalist's perspective which must allocate its time and resources among various
ventures-"Although the individual firm may be economically viable, the return on
time and capital to the individual venture capitalist is less than the opportunity cost,
which is why the venture is terminated."). See also John C. Ruhnka & John E.
Young, A Venture Capital Model of the Development Process for New Ventures, 2
J. Bus. VENTURING 167, 176 (1987) (describing the common strategy of "parlaying
of funding," the practice of venture capitalists of allocating later round funding to
only those ventures which are identified as "winners" after the early stages of
financing, thus allowing venture capitalists to "average-up" the total funds of the
venture capital fund invested in successful firms).
42 See Ruhnka et al., The "Living Dead" Phenomenon in Venture Capital
Investments, 7 J. Bus. VENTURING 137, 137 (1992) (empirical study finding that
approximately 20.6% of sample would end up as "living dead").
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responsibilities within the firm, such as being demoted or even being
fired.43 Moreover, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs often have different
preferences as to timing of an IPO. There is some evidence that venture
capitalists sometimes carry out IPOs prematurely-when waiting longer
would have led to a higher offering price or probability that the firm would
survive. Premature offerings can thus harm entrepreneurs. There is also
evidence that entrepreneurs are more likely to be fired the faster a firm is
forced to reach maturity, so that the venture capitalist can harvest its
investment.44 Nonetheless, a venture capitalist may rush an IPO in order to
satisfy current investors or attract new ones when it decides to raise
additional capital, a phenomenon known as "grandstanding. ' 4
B. Ex Post Bargaining Power of Entrepreneurs
As is usually the case with contracts among participants in business
firms, venture-capital contracts are incomplete.46 This incompleteness
exacerbates the opportunism problem discussed in the previous section,
since it allows venture capitalists to use their control over the board of
directors to exploit contractual gaps.47 However, incomplete contracts leave
43 See Lisa Vincenti, Venture-Backed M&A Surge Expected, VENTURE CAPITAL J.
(Oct. 1994) (discussing the use of mergers and acquisitions as a form of exit
mechanism for-venture capitalists and the potential threat they pose founders-
"Maintaining control-not to mention their jobs-is also critical to many
executives, who often see these threatened by mergers.").
44 See Thomas J. Dean and G. Dale Meyer, Venture Development in High-
Technology Firms: The Impact of Managerial Qualities Across the Organizational
Life Cycle, in FRONTIERS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH 93, 101-02 (Robert H.
Brockhaus, Jr. et al. eds. 1989); George C. Rubenson & Anil K. Gupta, The
Founder's Disease: A Critical Re-examination Evaluation, in FRONTIERS OF
ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH 167, 177-78 (Neil C. Churchill et al. eds. 1990)
(empirical study finding that if a venture grows slowly and the founder is "capable
of some adaptation," then a venture can become "quite large before the initial
succession is necessary").
45 See Paul A. Gompers, Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry, 42 J. FIN.
ECON. 133 (1996).
46 This incompleteness is a function of: (1) the bounded rationality of parties (their
inability to foresee all future contingencies or to fully process the information at
their disposal) (2) bargaining costs associated with negotiating and reaching an
agreement regarding the governance contracts and (3) costs associated with the
ability to write contracts that courts will be able to fully enforce. See HART, supra
note 9, at 23. For a slightly different list of transaction cost related constraints to
complete contracting, see OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 30 (1985)
(emphasizing also the role of opportunistic behavior by contracting parties and the
bilateral monopolies that emerge once parties make relationship-specific
investments). See also Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, Incomplete Written
Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature, 109 Q. J. OF ECON. 1085, 1086 (1994)
(describing the computational intractability problems when trying to write
complete contracts).
47 See generally Luigi Zingales, Corporate Governance, in THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 497, 498-99 (Peter Newman ed., 1998)
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open the possibility that both parties will engage in costly ex post
bargaining and strategic behavior.48 A venture capitalist will undoubtedly
have greater ex post bargaining power due to its formal control over the
venture.49 But legal control over innovation-intensive start-ups does not
provide as much bargaining power as it does in traditional manufacturing
firms.5" This is because the principal assets of innovation-intensive firms
are intangible in nature-human capital, information, and intellectual
property.51
Of critical importance will be the entrepreneur's ability to manage the
production and disclosure of information about the innovation and the
(arguing that in a world of complete corporate contracts, there would be no need
for the ex post governance provided by the board of directors and other corporate
governance mechanisms, since all potential future conflicts would be anticipated
and resolved ex ante).48 One way to view the renegotiation of firm contracts is as the exception, what
happens when there is some kind of organizational failure or crisis, or when an
unforeseen contingency occurs. We can subsume renegotiation of firm contracts
into a broader category of allocational decision, in which there is an allocation or
distribution of surpluses/losses or burdens/rights. I have argued elsewhere that even
in large public corporations one can profitably characterize the relationship
between shareholders and managers as an ongoing set of renegotiations, an ongoing
bargaining game. See Manuel A. Utset, Towards A Bargaining Theory of the Firm,
80 CORNELL L. REv. 540, 548 (1995).
49 For an account of venture capitalist-entrepreneur relations that places principal
emphasis on the control mechanisms used by venture capitalists, see Darwin V.
Neher, Staged Financing: An Agency Perspective, 66 REv. ECON. STuD. 255
(1999); Erik Berglof, A Control Theory of Venture Capital Finance, 10 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 247, 251 (1994); Optimal Investment, supra note 22, at 1462 (focusing on
the use of staged financing as a control mechanism); Hellmann, supra note 23, at
57; Lemer, supra note 23, at 302 (focusing on fact that venture capitalists increase
their control over the board of directors after a change in CEO); Ruhnka & Young,
supra note 41, at 167; Sahlman, supra note 4, at 506.Generally, ownership of a firm's physical assets is a principal source of ex post
bargaining power, since it gives the owner the right to exclude others from using
them to engage in production. See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and
the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1120 (1990). As Oliver Hart states,
"the owner of an asset has residual control rights over the asset: the right to decide
all usages of the asset in any way not inconsistent with a prior contract, custom or
law." HART, supra note 9, at 30 (emphasis in original).
51 Venture capitalists, often layer a variety of control mechanisms so that for any
particular set of decisions, they have at their disposal an assortment of control
mechanisms to give them leverage over an entrepreneur. See generally Hellmann,
supra note 23, at 60-61. Rajan and Zingales have offered a more general theory of
power in innovation-intensive firms such as venture capital financed firms, whose
principal assets are human capital and other forms of intangible assets, what they
have labeled "human capital organizations." See, e.g., Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi
Zingales, Power in the Theory of the Firm, 113 Q. J. ECON. 387, 387-88 (1998).
Their theory acknowledges that access to physical assets creates power within
firms but emphasizes a second source of power: access to intangible firm
resources-e.g., access to ideas, to customers, to firm members with information or
knowledge useful to others within the firm. See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi
Zingales, The Governance of the New Enterprise 23-25 (Nat'l Bur. Econ. Res.,
Working Paper 7958, 2000).
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firm's overall performance.52 The entrepreneur can keep knowledge and
information secret and time and frame disclosures to reduce the likelihood
of being fired and make it more likely that the venture capitalist will
finance additional stages.53 More generally, an entrepreneur's ability to
engage in self-preserving strategic behavior is due to the fact that venture
capital-financed firms are information and knowledge-intensive and that it
is the entrepreneur who controls these important intangible assets.
As a result, one would expect that an entrepreneur's bargaining power
will be highest during the earlier phases of the venture, before she has
transferred large amounts of innovation-specific information and
knowledge to the venture capitalist and others within the firm. While the
entrepreneur still controls this information and knowledge it can make
credible threats to exit the firm and take it with her. Her ability to exit will
be further enhanced by the fact that during this period it will be more
difficult for a court to enforce non-compete and non-disclosure agreements,
given the paucity of observable and verifiable information about the
existence and ownership of intangible assets. As information and
knowledge gets transferred and the firm acquires more tangible assets, the
entrepreneur's bargaining power will decrease.54 Of course, even during the
earlier phases, an entrepreneur will have to make certain disclosures in
order to convince a venture capitalist to fund additional stages. 55
52 See, e.g., Hans Landstr5m et al., Contracts Between Entrepreneurs and
Investors: Terms and Negotiation Processes, in FRONTIERS ENTREPRENEURSHIP
RESEARCH, 4 (1998) (citing evidence that entrepreneurs may manipulate
information for strategic advantage that tensions and conflicts often arise in the
relationship between the entrepreneur and venture capitalist).53 Leaving aside for a moment, securities laws and other disclosure requirements,
those in control of information can generally determine what information is
produced and the pace in which information is disclosed. For example before actual
earnings are released managers in companies who expect actual earnings to differ
from those expected by market participants will issue earnings guidance and
warnings, among other things, to try to change shareholder expectations gradually.54 As tangible assets increase, so does the venture capitalist's bargaining power.
For one thing, its legal ownership of the tangible assets allows it to control access
to them. Moreover, tangible assets can be sold, allowing a venture capitalist to
more credibly threaten to fire the entrepreneur or liquidate the venture and still
recuperate all or part of its investment. There is some empirical evidence showing
that as the assets of venture capital-financed firms become more tangible, the level
of monitoring by venture capitalists decreases. See Optimal Investment, supra note
22, at 1462. As the venture reaches the manufacturing stage, it will acquire
equipment that can be used as collateral to borrow funds. Moreover as the venture
reaches the marketing stage and starts selling products, it can sell accounts or
chattel paper to raise working capital. On the sale of accounts and chattel paper, see
enerally U.C.C. § 9-102(b) (1998).
But see M. Audrey Korsgaard & Harry J. Sapienza, Performance Feedback,
Decision Making Processes and Venture Capitalist Support for New Ventures, in
FRONTIERS ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH 452 (1995) (empirical study finding that
although the timely transfer of information from the entrepreneur to the venture
capitalist had a positive effect on the venture capitalist's trust of the entrepreneur,
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Nonetheless, knowledge, as opposed to information, will take longer to
transfer, since some of the innovation-specific knowledge will be "tacit
knowledge", which is best learned through experience-by "doing"--not
by listening or reading.
56
C. Choosing Between Finishing the Innovation and Acquiring Managerial
Skills
One can assume that during the early part of the venture an
entrepreneur will focus on the innovation process, with the goal of
improving and finishing the innovation and dealing with unforeseen
contingencies. As the venture progresses, the entrepreneur will need to
spend more time learning how to become an effective manager.57 Her
managerial skills will become increasingly important as the product reaches
the marketing stage, more employees are hired, and the venture capitalist
begins to think about harvesting its investment. During these later periods,
the ability of a venture to survive and grow will depend on the skills of its
managers. If the entrepreneur has not acquired the requisite skills, the
venture capitalist will be forced to replace her with a professional manager.
As we will now see the high-powered incentive schemes in venture-capital
contracts can lead an entrepreneur to make sub-optimal decisions about
how much time to invest becoming a good manager, as opposed to finishing
the innovation.
The standard principal-agent model is concerned with designing
contracts that provide the right incentives to risk-averse agents and
surprisingly it did not affect the decision by the venture capitalist whether to
commit more funds to the venture).56 Tacit knowledge can be defined as "the knowledge and techniques, methods and
designs that work in certain ways and with certain consequences, even when we
cannot explain exactly why." Jaqueline Senker, Tacit Knowledge and Models of
Innovation, 4 J. INDUST. & CORP. CHANGE 425, 426 (1995); Ashish Arora,
Licensing Tacit Knowledge: Intellectual Property Rights and the Market for Know-
How, 4 ECON. INNOv. NEW TECH. 41-42 (1995).57 Most venture capitalists will prefer to avoid the disruptions to a venture that are
produced when a founder/CEO is fired at too early a stage in the venture's
development. These disruptions, in fact, can undermine the firm just when it is
reaching the marketing phase. See ROBERT J. KUNZE, NOTHING VENTURED: THE
PERILS AND PAYOFFS OF THE GREAT AMERICAN VENTURE CAPITAL GAME 213-14
(1990) (arguing that replacing the CEO of a young company can be highly
destabilizing to the company, given that:
[T]he time spent hiring the new chief executive officer, the shock
to the organization when the changeover takes place, the lack of
direction in the interim ... all impact heavily on the health and
potential of the company. In the best of circumstances replacing a
chief executive officer is a wrenching experience and companies
can easily fail at this juncture.).
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optimally allocate risks between principals and agents.58 It does so through
compensation schemes that tie an agent's compensation to observable
performance measures, such as the firm's output.59 The highly complex
compensation schemes in the agency literature are rarely found in actual
contracts. One reason is that real-world agents usually perform multiple
tasks. As Holmstrom and Milgrom have observed, incentive schemes serve
not only to determine an agent's effort, but also how she allocates that
effort between different tasks.6"
Incentive schemes should therefore be designed with the aim of
ensuring not only that the agent exerts high effort, but that she
accomplishes the task or tasks that will maximize the principal's returns.
For example, if a lawmaker wants to create an incentive scheme for
teachers, it would have to tie their compensation to an observable outcome
that is a good proxy for how hard they are working-e.g., scores from
standardized tests. However, there are other skills valuable to students, such
as creativity, that are not easy to observe or quantify. One would expect that
teachers whose compensation is tied to test scores will spend more time
teaching the subjects that can be tested and less time teaching creativity and
other important but difficult to measure skills.
61
The high-powered incentive schemes in venture-capital contracts are
not well calibrated to deal with this dual-task principal-agent problem. As a
venture progresses, an entrepreneur must decide how much additional
58 It turns out that it is not generally possible to provide agents with the incentive to
exert the right level of effort while still allocating risks optimally between risk
averse agents and risk neutral principals. See generally Oliver Hart & Bengt
Holmstrrm, The Theory of Contracts, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY 71
tT.F. Bewley ed., 1987).
9 Traditional principal-agent models attempt to formulate optimal incentives for
motivating a risk-averse agent to maximize her level of effort. This requires
adopting a compensation scheme to adequately compensate an entrepreneur for the
risk she is undertaking. The entrepreneur will have a reservation value, or
participation value, that would be the minimum level of compensation she would
agree to given her outside options and the risks she will undertake. So the contract,
in essence, will end up dividing how much risk is kept by the principal, in our case,
a well-diversified, risk neutral venture capitalist, and how much risk will be
allocated to the risk-averse entrepreneur. Any time risk can be transferred from a
risk-averse to a risk-neutral individual without making the risk-neutral individual
worse off, the transfer will be Pareto-improving. The idea behind incentive
contracts is to trade offrisk against compensation: the greater the risk imposed on
the entrepreneur the greater should be the compensation. If the entrepreneur is
asked to bear too much of the risk, then we she is suffering a disutility which can
be reduced by transferring risk away from her and to the risk-neutral venture
capitalist.60 See Bengt Holmstrrm & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses:
Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24
(1991) [hereinafter Multitask Principal]; Bengt Holmstrrm & Paul Milgrom,
Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives, 55
ECONOMETRICA 303 (1987).61 See Multitask Principal, supra note 60, at 25.
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human capital to acquire, and of what type: general human capital,
transferable to other ventures, or firm-specific human capital, whose value
is partially or completely lost if she leaves the firm.62 As we have seen, the
innovation and any intellectual property associated with it are the property
of-the firm. As a result, an entrepreneur will choose to invest in innovation-
specific human capital only to the extent that she expects to continue to be
employed by the start-up. At the same time, in order to increase the
likelihood that she will not be replaced by a professional manager, an
entrepreneur has to learn how to be an effective manager.63 This
management-specific human capital has two important characteristics. First,
even if the entrepreneur is fired, she will be able to use those managerial
skills in other ventures-i.e. managerial knowledge is a form of general
human capital. Second, management decisions are made in public (at least,
in view of those within the venture) and memorialized in corporate minutes.
While this makes the entrepreneur more accountable for her management
decisions, it also allows her to reap the benefits of having her effort more
easily measured and compensated. Finally, management decisions tend to
produce results and thus rewards in the short-run.
On the other hand, the act of innovating (or working towards bettering
an existing innovation) is generally harder to observe and measure. Ideas
and innovations germinate in the mind of the entrepreneur over a period of
time, which can last years. Some thoughts and sketches may see the light of
day, but it is difficult to understand from looking at them just how hard the
entrepreneur has been working at innovating. In short, innovation is a
hidden (largely mysterious) exercise, which is hard to quantify until the
process is well along. Moreover, it is also a task that produces results
mainly in the long run, something that might worry entrepreneurs, given the
short time horizon of venture capitalists and the possibility that the
entrepreneur will be fired before she can fully share in the rewards of her
innovation.64
62 See generally GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 33-51 (3d ed. 1993).
63 For the sake of simplicity, we will focus on two types of tasks available to
entrepreneurs: (1) innovating and (2) managing. While there is room for
disagreement as to the precise contours of the distinction between these two, I use
the term "innovating" to refer principally to those activities aimed at creating a new
product or improving an existing one, and "managing" to refer to those activities
aimed at running the general affairs of the company as well as those associated
with producing and marketing the product. Of course, there are myriad other
activities that an entrepreneur may have to undertake, but focusing on these two
important tasks will allow us to draw attention to certain weaknesses in the types of
incentive mechanisms employed in practice.
64 It should be noted that for purposes of the dual task model, it does not matter if
the reverse is true-i.e. if innovating is more observable than managing. This is
because what drives the result in the dual task model is the difference in the
observability of the two tasks.
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One would thus expect that all other things being equal, the high-
powered incentives in venture-capital contracts would cause entrepreneurs
to take an active role in managing the company sooner than would be
efficient. In some cases, entrepreneurs may also have an incentive to slow
down the innovation process so as to give them time to acquire
management skills. 65 It is because of this type of distortion that some
commentators have argued that low-powered incentives are usually better
when providing incentive to participants in a firm.66 Finally, the nature of
the innovation process exacerbates the dual task problem by making it
difficult to ascertain when an entrepreneur should shift from innovating to
actively managing the firm. The innovation process is not a straight line
progression from design to development, to production, to marketing: it is
both serial and cyclical, involving "rapid feedback, mid-course corrections
to design, and redesign. 67 An entrepreneur must focus on innovating
activities (particularly making improvements to the innovation) during all
stages of the venture, even though as the venture gets closer to the
marketing stage, she will also have to shift her attention to marketing
issues.
D. The Innovator's Dilemma
Before a venture capitalist makes its investment, the entrepreneur has
control over the venture and innovation. She also has control over
innovation-specific information, the intellectual property and her general
human capital or know-how. As we have seen, a venture capitalist will
65 See Dean & Meyer, supra note 44 (empirical study showing that the slower a
firm grows, the more likely that the founder will not be fired); Rubenson & Gupta,
supra note 44.See WILLIAMSON, supra note 46. See also Pien Wang & Peng S. Chan, Top
Management Perception of Strategic Information Processing in a Turbulent
Environment, 16 LEADERSHIP & ORG. DEV. J. 33 (1995).
Top managers' enthusiasm in engaging in strategic information
viewing, search, and interpretation activities is influenced by the
manner in which they are rewarded .... It is expected that top
managers, whose rewards are based mainly on length of service
and/or short-term efficiency of performance, will either lack
motivation in performing strategic information processing
activities required in a turbulent environment or will attend to
and search only for familiar and internal information. In contrast,
top managers whose rewards are based primarily on their
contribution to strategic positioning and/or product/market
innovation, are likely to monitor broadly, proactively and
frequently to identify opportunities and threats. They are inclined
to pay more attention to novel environmental changes.
Id.
67 Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation and Antitrust, 4
HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 14-15 (1989).
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require the entrepreneur to relinquish ownership of the innovation and
intellectual property and her control over the venture; it will also insist on
having a monopoly right-or right of first refusal-over future financings.
After an entrepreneur transfers these ownership rights, her value to the
venture consists primarily in the innovation-specific and general human
capital over which she retains control.
Not surprisingly, venture capitalists will also want the entrepreneur to
transfer all relevant information about the innovation. However, because a
large amount of this information resides in the entrepreneur's brain, it is
difficult for the venture capitalist to verify the extent to which the
information transferred is accurate and complete.68 This section and the
following one argue that the high-powered incentives in venture-capital
contracts give entrepreneurs an incentive to delay transferring innovation-
specific information. This delay can reduce the overall value of the venture
and is another example of self-preserving strategic behavior by
entrepreneurs.
Suppose that an entrepreneur has an innovation that is finished and
ready to be marketed. In such a case, the value of the entrepreneur's general
and innovation-specific human capital will be relatively low, as will the
value of the professionalization services that a venture capitalist can
provide. As a result, one would expect that these sorts of finished
innovations would be sold independent of the entrepreneur's services.69 In
other words, unless the entrepreneur is also a .highly skilled manager,
society would be better off if a professional manager takes over for the
entrepreneur. And unless the entrepreneur has other potential valuable
innovations in the pipeline, her value to the venture will be relatively
small.70
68 If it were possible to completely transfer all relevant information and knowledge
at the time of a venture capitalist's initial investment, then one would expect that
the entrepreneur would do so in return for appropriate compensation. On the
varying degrees of complexity of governance structures required to deal with
different types of innovation transactions, see generally Steven Globerman,
Markets, Hierarchies, and Innovation, 14 J. ECON. ISSUES 977 (1980). For an
incomplete-contracts approach to the same problem, see Phillipe Aghion & Jean
Tirole, The Management of Innovation, 109 Q. J. EcON. 1185 (Nov. 1994).
69 For an analogous discussion of the role of complementary and independent assets
in justifying takeovers, where the goal is the optimal allocation of power between
the two parties involved, see HART, supra note 9, at 8 (discussing how, if two firms
with independent-i.e. not complementary-assets merge, it would not optimize
the allocation of power, since the new owner of the combined firms would not gain
any additional power and the prior owner, now an employee, would lose power and
oain little in return).
One would also expect that these sorts of ventures, if advanced enough, would be
financed not by venture capitalists but through debt or by offering shares to the
public.
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However, in most cases, a venture capitalist invests in two highly
intangible and complementary assets-a promising innovation, and an
entrepreneur's general and innovation-specific human capital, which
includes the knowledge and ability required to finish the innovation and
transform it into a marketable product. There are various reasons why
venture capitalists usually invest in the complete package-the innovation
and the entrepreneur. In cases where the innovation is still in an early phase
of development, the entrepreneur's skill and knowledge will be required to
successfully conclude the innovation process. In other words, the
innovation and the entrepreneur's human capital are complementary.
Entrepreneurs are valuable in a second way: as relatively inexpensive,
highly motivated (albeit inexperienced) managers. Finally, the
entrepreneur's attachment to her idea and innovation may be such that
buying the innovation alone would require the venture capitalist to pay a
premium to get the entrepreneur to sell it.
Once the innovation has been transformed into a marketable product,
the entrepreneur and the innovation are no longer complementary. From
that point onward, the value of the new product is independent from the
entrepreneur's human capital, and the entrepreneur becomes expendable,7'
unless she has become a skilled manager or has other valuable innovations
in the pipeline, Moreover, once the entrepreneur's innovation-specific
human capital loses its value, i.e. the innovation becomes marketable and
the venture gets closer to an IPO, it is easier to attract professional
managers to replace the entrepreneur. I will refer to the entrepreneur's
ability, through her own success, to bring about her own institutional
demise as the innovator's dilemma. As John Kenneth Galbraith put it: "The
great entrepreneur must, in fact, be compared in life with the male 'apis
mellifera.' He accomplishes his act of conception at the price of his own
extinction. 72 One would expect that an entrepreneur who is cognizant of
this dilemma would engage in self-preserving strategic behavior aimed at
making it more difficult for the venture capitalist to replace her with
professional managers.
E. The Informational Hold- Up Problem
This section argues that an entrepreneur facing the innovator's dilemma
has an incentive to strategically manage the disclosure of innovation-
specific information, something that can delay the completion of the
innovation and create other costly side effects. We can label this self-
71 In calculating the value to an entrepreneur of remaining employed by the
venture, one needs to take into account the existence of private benefits to the
entrepreneur. See TIROLE, supra note 12, at 16-17 (discussing some the private
benefits that managers received from managing company).72 Rubenson & Gupta, supra note 44, at 167 (quoting JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE
NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1971)).
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preserving non-disclosure or partial disclosure of information, the
informational hold-up problem. This section examines three types of
informational hold-up.
1. Entrenchment
An entrepreneur facing the innovator's dilemma and the prospect of
being fired from the venture can hold back information and know-how to
entrench herself. An entrepreneur will possess certain forms of knowledge
that will allow her to best produce and market the innovation. This
information may include such things as the range of uses of the new
product, technological limitations and potential for new innovations to
improve or complement it. The general organizational and management
literature provides support for the proposition that managers and other
employees tend to hoard information as a way of retaining their
employment and increasing their power within the organization.73 In
addition, there is some evidence showing information hoarding within
knowledge-intensive firms of the type financed by venture capitalists.7 4 It
73 See Vincent Alonzo and Daniel McQuillen, Best Corporate Asset: Brain
Power?, 170 INCENTIVE 7 (Jan. 1996) (describing how some companies, like Coca-
Cola Co., have hired "Chief Knowledge Officers" to "manage knowledge capital"
and why it is "important to establish the proper environment, values, behaviors and
measurements which reward behavior for contributing instead ofjust taking or
hoarding information and knowledge"); Dianne J. Cyr & Susan C. Schneider,
Implications for Learning: Human Resource Management in East-West Joint
Ventures, 17 ORG. STUD. 207, 221 (1996) (a case study of three joint ventures
between East and West European companies found that "employees in all three
ventures indicated that communication.., tended to be impeded by poor reporting
systems, a need for expediency and efficiency, or hoarding information as a way to
retain power"); Marc Hequet, Risk (Presenting Innovative Ideas to Superiors), 33
TRAINING 84, 91 (June 1996) (reporting statement of Hewlett-Packard's director of
education: "If information is not readily available, information becomes power ....
And if people want to control power, then they keep information."); William Roth,
The Dangerous Ploy of Downsizing, 18 Bus. FORuM 5, 6 (Sept. 22, 1993) (an
informal empirical study of the effects of downsizing using a class of twenty
M.B.A. students, all currently holding mid-level management positions, eighteen of
whom had personally experienced the downsizing process and another four who
had a close friend who had experienced downsizing, found that "after a downsizing
program employees begin hoarding information to increase their value" to the
firm); Michael Van Hoozer, Beware of Data Hoarders-When Information Isn't
Spread Around Due to Secrecy of Benign Neglect, The Organization Suffers,
INFORMATIONWEEK, May 30, 1994, at 100 (describing the effects of informational
hoarding, what he calls the "knowledge is king syndrome"-that is, when
individuals "intentionally withhold information from others to make themselves
more valuable to their company").
74 For exaiple, in a case study of a personal computer firm that used ad hoc teams
to address specific tasks, several managers interviewed stated that:
[H]oarding of valuable information was a common practice. The
ad hoc teams often resisted sharing their unique information. The
managers... speculated that this was because a team that shares
its information fully may lose its reason to exist. This is -
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should be kept in mind that one argument usually proffered for the
integration of production within firms (as opposed to production across
markets) is that integration helps increase the transfer of information among
firm members. 75 This is achieved, in part, through adoption of better
coordination mechanisms and use of low-powered incentives.76 All other
things being equal, a firm in which information hoarding is prevalent will
be at a disadvantage vis-A-vis firms within which information flows freely.
Finally, entrepreneurs are notorious for refusing to delegate authority to
others within the venture.77 Venture capitalists usually view this as further
evidence of the "founder's disease" - the belief that, as a general matter,
entrepreneurs are unable to become effective managers. However, when
one takes the informational hold-up problem into account, this reticence
toward delegation can be seen not as a flaw, but as a survival strategy.
Delegation would require the transfer of information and know-how, which
makes the entrepreneur more vulnerable. Moreover, delegation can be
costly to an entrepreneur, given that others within the venture are potential
competitors for her position, and the more information they get from her,
the more they become a viable alternative. 8
particularly true during the economically difficult times now
facing the company .... In the information-based organization,
information becomes the primary medium of value and
exchange, and who would give it away for free?
Thomas H. Davenport et al., Information Politics, 34 SLOAN MGMT. REv. 53, 62
(1992); Harry J. Sapienza & Anil K. Gupta, Pursuit of Innovation by New Ventures
and Its Effects on Venture Capitalist-Entrepreneur Relations, in FRONTIERS OF
ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH 304 (Robert H. Brockhaus, Jr. et al. eds. 1989)
providing anecdotal evidence of information hoarding in high-tech ventures).
See Kenneth J. Arrow, Vertical Integration and Communication, 6 BELL J. ECON.
173 (1975).
76 Low-powered incentives help enhance cooperation that in turn foster
informational transfers. See Edward P. Lazear, Pay Equality and Industrial
Politics, 97 J. POL. ECON. 561, 562 (1989) (arguing that, while competition among
workers in an organization can lead to increased effort and output, competition also
"discourages cooperation among [workers] and can lead to outright sabotage").
7 See Thomas J. Dean & G. Dale Meyer, Venture Development in High-
Technology Firms: The Impact of Managerial Qualities Across the Organizational
Life Cycle, in FRONTIERS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH 93, 104-05 (Robert H.
Brockhaus, Jr. et al. eds. 1989) (empirical study finding that "failure to delegate
and listen to others ranked high on the list of reasons" why founders fail); Gary E.
Willard et al., In Order to Grow, Must the Founder Go: A Comparison of
Performance Between Founder and Non-Founder Managed High-Growth
Manufacturing Firms, 7 J. Bus. VENTURING 181, 182-83 (summary of literature on
founders' reluctance to delegate).
78 See Rebecca Sisco, Put Your Money Where Your Teams Are; Rewarding
Teamwork, 29 TRAINING 41 (July 1992) (arguing that organizations create a
misincentive when "employees are urged to cooperate but paid to compete" since at
best it "leads people to focus solely on their own behavior and not on improving
work systems and processes" and at worst it "encourages them to sabotage one
another's performance by hoarding information, ignoring co-worker's requests or
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2. Monitoring Manipulation
Informational hold-up may also arise because of the fact that an
entrepreneur's information and innovation-specific know-how can be used
to evaluate the viability of the venture and the entrepreneur's performance.79
The more information and know-how that others within the organization
(including the venture capitalist) have regarding the innovation, the better
they can evaluate the prospects and limits of the venture, and the more
easily they can monitor the entrepreneur and measure her performance.
Although an entrepreneur will have to disclose certain information about
the innovation in order to convince the venture capitalist to fund subsequent
stages, a rational entrepreneur will want to tailor the disclosure to minimize
its usefulness in evaluating her overall performance.
3. Option Value from Saving Information
Informational hold-up may also occur because of the fact that an
entrepreneur, anticipating the risk of being fired, will hope to retain
exclusive access to innovation-specific know-how and information for use
in future ventures. 80 Of course, there are usually contractual provisions to
even making others look bad"); Beverly Geber, The Bugaboo of Team Pay, 32
TRAINING 25, 32 (Aug. 1995) (describing incentives of individuals to hoard.
information or scheme "to undermine rivals for a promotion they want"); Beverly
Geber, Virtual Teams, 32 TRAINING 36 (Apr. 1995) ("organizations have created
cultures in which informational hoarding is rewarded"). See also Edward P. Lazear
& Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts, 89 J.
POL. ECON. 841 (1981).
79 In fact, an entrepreneur facing the possibility of being replaced or of having the
venture liquidated will expend resources and time to try to influence the venture
capitalist not to do so. These expenditures are deadweight costs since they are not
aimed at increasing the size of the pie but at trying to influence how it is
distributed. In an attempt to look good before the venture capitalist, the
entrepreneur may also behave in a manner that will signal her competence,
irreplaceability, or other important characteristics. These signaling activities are
costly, not only because they take time, but because they may lead the entrepreneur
to act in ways that reduce the firm's overall value. For a discussion of this sort of
influence costs, see generally Paul R. Milgrom, Employment Contracts, Influence
Activities, andEfficient Organization Design, 96 J. POL. ECON. 42 (1988).80 See, e.g., James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Start-ups, Spin-offs, and Internal
Projects, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 362, 362 (1995) (examining "the incentive problem
[created] when [an] employee privately discovers a significant invention and faces
a choice between keeping the invention private and leaving the firm to form a new
company (start-up), or transferring knowledge and attempting to gain compensation
from the firm (spin-off)"); Sudipto Bhattacharya et al., Licensing and the Sharing
of Knowledge in Research Joint Ventures, 56 J. ECON. THEORY 43 (1992)
(examining the usefulness of two different types of licensing agreements in
fostering the efficient sharing of knowledge and level of research and
development); Ariel Pakes & Shmuel Nitzan, Optimum Contracts for Research
Personnel, Research Employment, and the Establishment of 'Rival' Enterprises, 1 J.
LAB. ECON. 345 (1983) (examining the problem of hiring research scientists when
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prevent future competition and to prevent disclosure of trade secrets. Non-
compete agreements, where enforceable, have to be narrowly tailored in
order to withstand judicial scrutiny.81 Non-disclosure agreements do
provide greater constraints, but they usually apply only to company-specific
information, which, of course, would not include information that the
company had not been given. The corporate opportunity doctrine will also
act as a constraint on future use of innovations developed while with the
venture. Non-disclosure agreements, trade secret law and the corporate
opportunity doctrine, however, may also produce perverse informational
effects by giving entrepreneurs a further incentive to withhold information
about new innovations that they have come up with while employed by the
venture. This reluctance to reveal information about a second innovation is
exacerbated by the general problem of establishing clear-cut property rights
over it.
82
F. Misincentives Created by the Use of Staged Financing
There are three types of self-preserving strategic behavior arising out of
the use of staged financing. First, staged financing can lead to a ratcheting
effect. Each time the venture capitalist provides funds to the firm it will
usually provide some kind of performance objectives or milestone to be met
by the firm before the venture capitalist agrees to provide more funds. An
entrepreneur thus will have an incentive to provide just enough effort to
meet the requirements for getting another round of financing, instead of
rushing things or trying to overachieve. As we have already seen, an
entrepreneur sometimes has an incentive to slow down the innovation
process for other reasons.
Secondly, staged financing can lead to myopic behavior by
entrepreneurs-a focus on meeting short-term pressures as opposed to
maximizing long-term returns. Managers of public corporations sometimes
engage in myopic behavior: due to the high-powered incentives of capital
markets they choose to focus on projects that will yield relatively smaller
returns in the short-run than those that will maximize the long-term profits
one takes into account the possibility that they can later use the information they
acquire while in the venture in a rival venture).
81 See, e.g., Steven N.S. Cheung, Property Rights in Trade Secrets, 20 ECON.
INQUIRY 40 (1982).
82See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL FACTORS, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 609 (1962). See
also James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Expropriation and Inventions:
Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights, 84 AMER. ECON. REV. 190
(1994); David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL. 285 (1986)
(showing how in some cases those outside a firm (e.g., customers, competitors) can
appropriate all or part of the economic rents from innovation).
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of the company. High-powered incentives in venture capital contracts and,
in particular, the use of staged financing are meant to replicate (as much as
possible) the type of pressure provided by public markets. Not surprisingly,
they can lead entrepreneurs to act myopically. One can contrast this result
to Holmstrom's argument that one reason a disproportionate amount of
innovation occurs in small firms is that they are not subject to the distorting,
myopia-causing effects of the high-powered incentives of capital markets.83
A venture capitalist may also engage in myopic behavior. For example, a
venture capitalist holding a portfolio of companies may find that one
company is a star--"a company which is so successful that it pays for all
the failures and humdrum performers in [its] ... portfolio. 84 A star will be
sold through an initial public offering. After it is sold and the gains reaped,
a venture capitalist that wants to close up the venture capital fund will
liquidate certain ventures in the portfolio, particularly the "living dead" and
the barely living.85
Thirdly, staged financing can create a prisoner's dilemma problem. By
dividing the life of the venture into a set of short, discrete phases, staged
financing increases the probability that the entrepreneur and the venture
capitalist will find themselves in a short-run horizon situation in which it is
in their individual interest to act opportunistically. Even if one of the parties
is not facing a short-run horizon, it may still choose to act opportunistically
if it believes that the other party is facing a short horizon. In some cases,
both parties would be better off, as a group, if they abstained from acting
opportunistically. Whenever they act contrary to this joint interest due to
their short-term individual interests, they suffer a collective welfare loss. As
such it is an instance of the prisoners' dilemma.
G. The Costs Associated With the Failure of Otherwise Viable Ventures
High-tech start-ups often fail. High failure rates are to be expected in
any new venture, but especially in those built around technology-intensive
products. As we saw above, governance structures based on physical, as
opposed to intangible, assets allows the owner of those assets to specify
how they are to be used, thereby reducing ex post opportunistic behavior.86
Firms comprising mostly intangible assets tend to be harder to govern and
keep together, since disagreement among firm members can lead to the exit
83 See Holmstrom, supra note 8.
84 See Richard Gourlay, Survey of Venture and Development Capital, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 1994, at VI.
85 See Klein, supra note 10, at 361 (in discussing contracts between publishers and
songwriters, states that "the possibility for reverse publisher cheating is real. If for
example, the songwriter unexpectedly become such a great success that current
sales by this one [songwriter] represent a large share of the present discounted
value of total publisher sales, the implicit contract enforcement mechanism may not
work").
86 See HART, supra note 9, at 3-4.
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of one or more of them, and ultimately the firm's dissolution. 87 Both
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs have some interest in showing
commitment to the venture. If each party believes that the other is about to
exit neither will have an incentive to invest in transaction-specific assets.88
It follows that one way of showing this commitment is by making
transaction-specific investments, 89 but as the venture's prospects decrease,
parties will be less likely to continue doing so.90
The high number of failures among ventures financed by venture
capitalists can, at least in part, be explained by governance shortcomings in
venture capital contracts. 9' For example, Gorman and Sahlman have argued
that in some cases "the [venture capital] process itself may promote
failure. 9 2 In a similar vein, an empirical study -of Silicon Valley firms
found that entrepreneurs of failed firms considered "problems with the
venture capital relationship" to be an important cause of their firm's
failure. 93 The propensity of venture capitalists for firing entrepreneurs 94 and
87 For a discussion of the "flimsiness" of firms caused by the lack of hard assets,
see id. at 58-59.88 Samsom and Gurdon undertook a survey study of twenty-two scientists and
twenty venture partners in order to discern the principal differences in approach to
the venture between the two groups. The authors found that half of the ventures
studied had experienced "serious venture team related upheavals since inception"
of the venture. These upheavals usually resulted in one or more of the team
members leaving the venture, whether scientist, venture capitalist or professional
manager. The different team members were found to have different perspectives on
the time required to finish the product, with scientists arguing for a longer period
while venture capitalists were more concerned with getting the product to market as
quickly as possible. See Karel J. Samsom & Michael A. Gurdon, Entrepreneurial
Scientists: Organizational Performance in Scientist-Started High Technology
Firms, in FRONTIERS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH 437, 443 (Neil C.
Churchill et al. eds., 1990) (the authors conducted forty-two interviews with
twenty-two scientists and twenty venture partners, mostly in New England and
9uebec and Ontario).
Id. at 107.
90 Id. at 108.
91 Generally, a "firm" can be viewed as a cooperative venture where the parties
have common goals-maximizing the value of the firm-and potentially
conflicting ones-maximizing their individual return-even if at the expense of
other parties. Where conflicting goals become paramount, as when a firm
approaches bankruptcy, the firm's viability can very quickly deteriorate. See
THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986).
92 See Gorman & Sahlman, supra note 30, at 238 (arguing that "'failure' is at the
very least endemic to the venture capital process, an expected, commonplace event;
in some cases even the process itself may promote failure").93 The empirical study tracked 250 Silicon Valley firms since 1960. The authors
found that (as of 1984) ninety-six firms had failed. Of those firms they successfully
used a sample ten firms that failed in the 1960's and twelve firms that failed in the
1980's. Four of the eleven founders of the 1960 firms identified the category
"[p]roblems with the venture capital relationship" as "a major cause of failure."
One of the twelve 1980 founders found this category was a major cause of the
firm's failure, while another three of the twelve interviewed found that it had
played a part, but just a minor part in the firms' failure. See Albert W. Bruno & Joel
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their use of high-powered incentives can undermine trust and cooperation
within firms 95 and create other misincentives 96 that, in turn, can increase the
likelihood that the firm will fail. Additionally, one would expect that the
strategic behavior of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists will increase
when the venture is experiencing financial or innovation setbacks-given
that as the parties get closer to ending their relationship, reputational
constraints will become less binding.97 Finally, venture capitalists take the
high failure rate of start-ups as a given; if for no other reason, one can infer
this from the fact that they stage their capital inputs and adopt contracts
K. Leidecker, A Comparative Study of New Venture Failure: 1960 v. 1980,
FRONTIERS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH 375, 382-83 (Neil C. Churchill et al.
eds. 1987). See also Bruno et al., supra note 36, at 689 (arguing, generally, that
problems with the venture capitalist relationship were an important factor in the
failure of the firms that they sampled).94 See ROBERT J. KUNZE, NOTHING VENTURED: THE PERILS AND PAYOFFS OF THE
GREAT AMERICAN VENTURE CAPITAL GAME (1990) (arguing that replacing the
CEO of a young company can be highly destabilizing to the company, given that
the time spent hiring the new chief executive officer, the shock to
the organization when the changeover takes place, the lack of
direction in the interim ... all impact heavily on the health and
potential of the company. In the best of circumstances replacing a
chief executive officer is a wrenching experience and companies
can easily fail at this juncture.).
95 On the role of high-powered incentives in undermining cooperation and unity
within a group, see Oliver Williamson, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM, ch. 6 (1985); Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Regulating Trade
Among Agents, 146 J. INST. & THEOR. ECON. 85 (1990); Hideshi Itoh, Incentives to
Help in Multi-Agent Situations, 59 ECONOMETRICA 611 (1991); Edward P. Lazear,
Pay Equality and Industrial Politics, 97 J. POL. ECON. 561 (1989).
96 For example, in a report of the spate of biotechnology failures in 1994, one
reason given by analysts for the failures was the fact that "[s]ome biotech
companies, strapped for resources and under pressure from investors, have been
cutting comers in designing and conducting their clinical trials, jeopardizing the
usefulness of the results." Alex Barnum, High-Profile Flops Hit Biotech,
Promising Drugs Often Founder in Human Trials, S.F. CHRON., June 13, 1994, at
BI (reporting Medlmune, Inc.'s, failure to get FDA approval for the company's lead
product, due to sloppy clinical trials). See also Amar Bhide, Bootstrap Finance:
The Art of Start-Ups, 70 HARV. BUS. REv. 106 (1992) (arguing that "[c]onflicts
between investors in a business and its day-to-day managers are a fact of life"; that
outside investors, such as venture capitalists, can diminish the flexibility of
entrepreneurs to adapt, to engage in "the try-it, fix-it approach required in the
uncertain environments in which start-ups flourish"; and reporting the experience
of a former CEO of an advanced materials company who succumbed to the
pressures created by the outside investors to stick with the original strategy, even
though he knew it was untenable--"I wish I had stood my ground and said, 'I'm
turning off the furnace tomorrow.' But I didn't quite have the guts to do that.").
97 See William D. Guth et al., Cognition, Enactment and Learning in the
Entrepreneurial Process, in FRONTIERS OF ENTREPRENEURIAL RESEARCH 242 (Neil
C. Churchill et al. eds. 1991) (noting entrepreneur's increased focus on external risk
factors as the venture experienced severe setbacks). For an example where such a
spiraling effect and quick dissolution occurred in the venture capital area, see
Foster v. Churchill, 665 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1996).
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with well-specified exit strategies.98 It is important, however, to look at the
issue of venture survival not only from the perspective of the venture
capitalist and entrepreneur. Society has a vested interest in the survival of
otherwise viable firms,99 particularly given the social and economic
importance of innovations.' 00
III. ROADBLOCKS TO THE EMERGENCE OF
OPTIMAL VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTS
The paper has so far identified various misincentives created by
standard venture capital contracts. These misincentives can reduce social
welfare by reducing the number of valuable innovations that get financed or
make it to the market. It follows that identifying and reducing these
misincentives can allow venture capitalists to design more efficient
contracts, and, where they do not have the proper incentives, for a
lawmaker to adopt legal rules to cause them to internalize the externalities
produced by their standard 'contracts. This Part examines a number of
roadblocks to the emergence of optimal venture capital contracts.
A. Bargaining Power of Venture Capitalists
In general, a bargaining context is one in which two or more parties
negotiate with each other regarding the possibility of cooperating to
produce a surplus that they would then divide in some way.'0' Venture
98 One reason that venture capitalists use staged financing is to keep open a greater
number of outside options. One can assume that when 'the parties entered into the
venture they did so because the expected returns from participating.in the venture
were greater than the expected return from accepting another investment option.
However, during the life of the venture the party's outside options will change. It is
possible that at some point a party will find that an outside option is more valuable
than remaining in the venture. At that point, the party may choose to exit, leading
-to the dissolution of the venture. The outside options of the venture capitalist
include new potential investments. The emergence of new outside options can lead
a venture capitalist to liquidate a venture if it has tangible assets or intellectual
property that can be sold to a third party. It may also lead the venture capitalist to
sell the firm to a third party or the public sooner than optimal. See generally David
Roth, A Theory of Partnership Dynamics, 12 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 95 (1996).
99 In other words, we must analyze the extent to which negative externalities are
produced that affect third parties. See, e.g., PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS,
ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATIONS AND MANAGEMENT 75 (1992).
1oo See, e.g., Eric L. Talley, Disclosure Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1956
(2011) (arguing that the distortions produced by the strategic behavior of parties
when one party has superior information may lead parties to fail to reach beneficial
bargains and, in certain cases, encourage value-destroying agreements).
101 More specifically, a bargaining scenario is one in which (a) the parties have the
potential to conclude an agreement beneficial to both, (b) there is conflict as to
which agreement to conclude, and (c) no agreement may be imposed on a party
without her approval. See MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBENSTEIN, BARGAINING
AND MARKETS 1 (1990).
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capital contracts are in large part a set of rules for allocating surpluses and
losses associated with the start-up. If the two parties are engaged in longer
term transactions, where they will be bargaining repeatedly-as is the case
in the venture capital context-it is useful to divide the types of stakes over
which they bargain into substantive stakes and procedural stakes.
Substantive stakes are the actual monetary surplus that the parties divide
each round of their ongoing, repeated bargaining game. Each round the
parties may also reach agreement on procedural stakes: the formal and
informal constraints and governance rules that will be in effect in future
bargaining rounds. These constraints and governance rules will in turn
affect the bargaining power that each party will have in future periods. As a
result, they will determine the way that substantive and procedural stakes
are divided in future bargaining rounds. For example, one can analyze the
informational holdup problem through a bargaining lens. The entrepreneur
and the venture capitalist bargain both explicitly and implicitly over
procedural stakes-innovation-specific information-that will affect future
bargaining rounds.
There are a number of factors that give venture capitalists a bargaining
advantage over entrepreneurs. Venture capitalists are repeat players who
understand the transactions, potential risks, and contracts better than do
entrepreneurs. In addition, venture capitalists know that once negotiations
and due diligence get under way (a process that may take up to six months
or more), the entrepreneur will have made transaction-specific investments
that they will lose if the deal falls through. When that occurs, the
entrepreneur will need to find a new venture capitalist interested in
investing in the venture. However, the fact that one venture capitalist has
already engaged in due diligence and rejected the deal will exacerbate the
adverse selection problem faced by the entrepreneur. In other words, the
rejection by the first venture capitalist will send a signal that there may be
inherent problems with the proposed venture. This in turn will allow the
initial or subsequent venture capitalist to extract from the entrepreneur a
greater portion of the venture's expected returns. As a result, except for
well-established entreprieneurs with a track record or a well-developed
valuable innovation, entrepreneurs are usually at a bargaining disadvantage
vis-A-vis venture capitalists. As we will now see, while having a bargaining
advantage gives venture capitalists the ability to dictate contract terms, it
can also lead to the emergence and survival of inefficient standard form
contracts.
B. Bargaining Distortions Due to Overwhelming Bargaining Power
In theory, a rational venture capitalist will continue to add additional
provisions to its contracts until the marginal cost of adding an additional
provision equals the marginal benefit. All other things being equal, a
contract will be more complete, the greater the bargaining power of one of
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the parties at the time of entering into a contract. Where there are large
asymmetries of bargaining power, the weakeir party will be forced to either
forego a deal altogether or accept contractual terms that are against its
interest. The lack of resistance by the weaker party will lead to a reduced
incentive by the dominant party to design contracts that increase the joint
welfare of both parties. Additionally, the weaker party's suggestions are an
important source of potential contractual innovation which is lost wheri the
weaker party has no incentive to suggest modifications to the standard
contracts. Over time, this asymmetry in bargaining power will lead to the
emergence of one-sided standard contracts that benefit the dominant
party.102 There is no reason to believe ex ante that these contracts will
maximize the joint welfare of the venture capitalist and entrepreneur and
minimize, negative externalities. In short, there is no reason to believe that
standard venture capital contracts will maximize social welfare.
More generally, venture capitalists will have an incentive to modify
their contracts each time a provision fails to act in the manner intended or a
contractual gap is discovered. One would expect that over time contracts
will become more complex and have multiple provisions targeting the same
type of.behavior.10 3 Because of the one-sided nature of the contracting
process, venture capitalists are unlikely to modify contracts in a way that
reduces complexity and satisfies the principle of Occam's razor. Venture
capitalists that can get an entrepreneur to agree to one-sided contract
provisions may see little harm in doing so, since they can get the upside
when they work as intended and waive them when they misfire.
There are three main problems with this line of reasoning. First, the
entrepreneur will engage in self-preserving strategic behavior vis-At-vis the
full set of contract provisions, given that the venture capitalist has not pre-
committed to waiving any of them. An ex ante commitment to waiving
them will be equivalent to not adopting them to begin with. Second, a
decision by a venture capitalist not to enforce one contractual provision can
have the unintended side-effect of reducing the disciplining effect of other
provisions. In other words, when a venture capitalist agrees to a waiver, an
entrepreneur will update her assessment of the likelihood that it will waive
other provisions in the future. Third, because of the multi-layered,
intertwined incentive mechanisms in venture capital contracts, the
102 See JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 126-127, 140 (1992)
(arguing that institutions and rules arise out of a process of strategic conflict in
which actors vie for distributional advantage and that the party with superior
resources and bargaining power will be able to force other parties "to act in ways
contrary to their unconstrained preferences"; after a while self-enforcing rules-
favorable to the party with the bargaining power-will emerge, and gather path
dependence, even if they are not optimal).
103 See Hellmann, supra note 23, at 25, n.32 (questioning why venture capitalists
adopt multiple incentive mechanisms targeting the same type of behavior).
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triggering of one provision can trigger others, thereby making selective
waivers more difficult.
Because venture capitalists are repeat players, reputational concerns
can, at least in theory, reduce their incentive to act opportunistically at the
time of contracting or during the venture.1°4 However, for reputation to be a
viable constraint, future parties must be able to observe the opportunistic
behavior or receive credible reports from third parties. They must also be
able to distinguish between opportunism and proper behavior. When a
venture capitalist decides to fire an entrepreneur or liquidate a venture, it
weighs numerous factors and does so using information about the
entrepreneur and venture not available to outside observers. This increases
the difficulty of determining whether a venture capitalist is acting
opportunistically. The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that a
venture capitalist concerned about future litigation will have an incentive to
leave a paper trail characterizing its behavior as justified and within the
scope of its contract with the entrepreneur.10 5
C. The Exacerbating Role Played by Lawyers and Venture Capital Fund
Investors
Venture capitalists will have a comparative advantage in identifying
misincentives created by the high-powered incentives in their standard form
contracts, but unless legally trained they will have to rely on lawyers to
advise them on potential legal and contractual risks. However, the interests
of lawyers and venture capitalists will not always converge,10 6 something
that can lead to the emergence and survival of inefficient venture capital
contracts.
First, lawyers will have an incentive to draft contracts that do not
deviate too much from the contracts that they have used in the past with the
same venture capitalist. This is not only because the venture capitalist will
understand those contracts better, but also because changing them may
signal that prior contracts drafted by the same lawyer were defective.
Furthermore, lawyers have an incentive to adopt contracts similar to those
adopted by other lawyers in similar transactions, so as to economize on
interpretation costs and not appear as an outlier from the "herd" of venture
104 On reputation, see David Chamy, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Law, 104
HARv. L. REv. 373 (1990).
105 See Foster v. Churchill, 665 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1996) (venture capitalists fired
founders "for cause," but court found that the reasons given for termination weregroundless).
For a discussion of the potential divergence of interest between corporate
lawyers and their clients, see generally Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path
Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and
Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 347 (1996).
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capitalist lawyers. 0 7 The emergence of standard forms in the venture
capital context is in part a product of the fact that the community of lawyers
working on these contracts is relatively small and geographically
concentrated. This makes it easier for lawyers to observe and copy what
others are doing. Moreover, these lawyers are repeat players who
sometimes represent venture capitalists and other times represent investors
in venture capital funds or entrepreneurs. This dulls the incentive to propose
innovative contract provisions and forcefully argue for them. Finally and
relatedly, deviations from standard forms require a lawyer to expend
resources to innovate; but once she has developed a new contract she will
not be able to exclude others from free riding on her efforts.10 8
The contracting decisions of venture capitalists are also affected by the
fact that they will have to raise funds from investors. Standard limited
partnership agreements between an investor and venture capitalists contain
provisions that allow the investor to monitor and discipline the venture
capitalists, as well as a number of other incentive mechanisms to assure that
they exert the right amount of effort and do not collude with
entrepreneurs. 109 A venture capitalist contemplating making changes to the
contracts with its portfolio companies (i.e. to its venture capital contracts)
has to weigh the potential benefit from such changes against the potential
costs if the changes backfire. Using standard agreements increases the
likelihood that investors will understand them and find them acceptable. In
short, investors in venture capital funds are repeat players who have certain
expectation about what venture capital contracts look like. 10
Finally, in deciding whether to make changes to these contracts, a
venture capitalist will also want to take into account the probability that
investors will credit any increase or decrease in the fund's returns to these
changes. Moreover, a venture capitalist will have an incentive to make
changes whose effect will be more easily observed and measured by the
107 In other words, if the contracts turn out to be defective, the whole herd can share
the blame. See id. at 355-56 (discussing herding model set forth in David
Scharfstein & Jeremy Stein, Herd Behavior and Investments, 80 AM. ECON. REV.
465 (1990)).
108 According to Bankman, the potential "free rider" problem arising from the lack
of property rights over the contractual innovation is one of the reasons that venture
capitalists have not changed the way that ventures are structured to take advantage
of tax savings. See Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 42
UCLA L. REv. 1737 (1994).
109 The standard agreements include covenants (1) restricting the amount of funds
that can be invested in any one venture, (2) limiting borrowing, (3) limiting re-
investments, (4) restricting the venture capitalist's outside activities and ability to
start other funds, and (5) restricting the types of ventures in which the venture
capitalists can invest. See Keith W. Schilit, Evaluating the Performance of Venture
Capital Investments, 37 Bus. HORIZ. 70 (1994).
0See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REv. 757, 786-89 (1995) (discussing learning effect when
repeat players are involved).
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investor. Using vanilla, high powered-incentives is a better signal of the
venture capitalist's concern with adequately motivating entrepreneurs than
is tailoring venture capital contracts to deal with the more difficult to
observe and quantify misincentives identified in Part II. So one can
conjecture that one reason that venture capitalists have not dealt with these
misincentives is they believe that investors will not be able to properly
value their efforts in tailoring their contracts.
D. Entrepreneurial Overoptimism
A number of studies have found that entrepreneurs tend to be
overoptimistic about their own abilities and are less likely to thoroughly
search for information at the time of forming a venture. According to
various studies, reported by March and Shapira, managers generally believe
that "risk is manageable,"' 1 and that they can control it." 2 This belief in
their ability to control risks leads them to be overoptimistic and undervalue
statistical information that could be relevant to their decision-making." 13 A
number of studies, however, have shown that entrepreneurs tend to be more
overoptimistic than both professional managers and non-entrepreneurs.1
4
Furthermore, studies show that "entrepreneurs, whether well prepared or
not, may experience 'entrepreneurial euphoria,' in which they begin with a




One study found that "entrepreneurs perceive their prospect for success
as substantially better than those for similar businesses" and that
"entrepreneurs' perceptions of their own chances for success do not seem to
be systematically related to factors which previous research suggests might
l See James G. March & Zur Shapira, Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk
Taking, in DECISIONS & ORGANIZATIONS 76, 85 (James G. March ed. 1988)
(managers surveyed believed that the situations that they faced involved risk-
taking, where managerial skill and information can reduce the uncertainty, "not
ambling" where the odds are uncontrollable, and produced by outside factors).
2Id. (seventy-five percent of managers, in a survey carried out by Shapira, saw
"risk as controllable").
13 Id. at 86-88.
114 See, e.g., Daniel M. Spitzer, Jr. et al., Business Planning in New, High
Technology Firms, in FRONTIERS ENTREPRENEURIAL RESEARCH 398 (1989);
Gaylen N. Chandler & Erik Jansen, The Founder's Self-Assessed Competence and
Venture Performance, 7 J. Bus. VENTURING 223, 233 (1992) (in a survey study of
founders, finding that founders of high-growth companies rate themselves highly
on traditional entrepreneurial skills as well as in managerial and technical skills);
Arnold C. Cooper, Carolyn Y. Woo & William C. Dunkelberg, Entrepreneurs'
Perceived Chances for Success, 3 J. Bus. VENTURING 97, 98 (1988); Norris F.
Krueger, The Impact of Prior Entrepreneurial Exposure On Perceptions of New
Venture Feasibility and Desirability, 18 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 5,
13 (1993). See also March & Shapira, supra note 111, at 85 (quoting a successful
high tech entrepreneur: "In starting my company I didn't gamble; I was confident
we were going to succeed.").
115 See, e.g., Cooper et al., supra note 114, at 107.
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be associated with success."'1 16 The entrepreneurs in the study were asked
two questions:
"What are the odds of your business succeeding?"
"What are the odds of any business like yours succeeding?"
The entrepreneurs were asked to choose odds ranging from a 0 chance
in 10, to a perfect 10 chances in 10 of success. They found that: (1) 95% of
the entrepreneurs believed the odds of success of their business to be at
least 5 in 10, as opposed to a belief that only 78% of any business like
theirs had odds of success of at least 5 in 10 (2) 81% perceived the odds of
success of their business to be at least 7 in 10, as opposed to 39% of any
business like theirs (3) 55% perceived the odds of success of their business
to be at least 9 in 10, as opposed to 16% of any business like theirs, and (4)
33% perceived the odds of success of their business to be a perfect 10 out
of 10, as opposed to 11% of any business like theirs."7 In short,
entrepreneurs are far more confident in their business succeeding than a
business like theirs succeeding. The authors conclude that these
assessments did not comport with the rational choice model, and were
better explained by the cognitive literature on overconfidence." 8
A number of studies have also shown that entrepreneurs tend to
interpret facts more optimistically than do non-entrepreneurs. In other
words, when a professional manager and an entrepreneur are presented with
the same set of facts about a potential venture, the entrepreneur interprets
the facts more positively. Thus, although both the entrepreneur and.
professional manager have the same attitude about the level of risk that they
would be willing to undertake, the entrepreneur frames and interprets the
facts in a manner that leads her to perceive the venture as being less
risky.119
..
6 Id. at 106.
117Id. at 103.
118 Id. at 106. Similarly, in a survey study of 576 entrepreneurs in high technology
companies, Spitzer et al. found a level of entrepreneurial overconfidence
comparable to that found by Cooper et al. In the survey, respondents estimated
their chances for success to be 74.1%, on average. On the other hand, they
estimated the chance of success for a business like yours to be 43.3%, on average.'
See Spitzer, Jr. et al., supra note 114, at 404-05. See also Krueger, supra note 114,
at 13 (finding further support for the Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberger data
refarding the general overoptimism of entrepreneurs).
19For example, Palisch and Bagby found that entrepreneurs categorize equivocal
business scenarios more positively than did other subjects, "perceiving more
strengths than weaknesses, opportunities versus threats, and potential for
performance improvement versus deterioration." See Leslie Palisch & D. Ray
Bagby, Using Cognitive Theory to Explain Entrepreneurial Risk-Taking:
Challenging Conventional Wisdom, 10 J. Bus. VENTURING 425, 433 (1995). See
also Donald D. Myers & Daryl J. Hobbs, Technical Entrepreneurs-Are They
Different?, in FRONTIERS OF ENTREPRENEURIAL RESEARCH 659, 670 (Robert
Ronstadt et al. eds. 1986) (survey of over 1000 entrepreneurs or individuals who
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In a study of information gathering by new entrepreneurs in 1,176
ventures, the authors found that the entrepreneurs were less likely to acquire
information relevant to the venture. The study analyzed the extent to which
entrepreneurs in the process of forming a new venture acquired and used
information from professional experts such as accountants, lawyers and
bankers. The study had three main findings. First, entrepreneurs without
prior experience sought information from friends, family and other business
owners, but, surprisingly, did not seek much information from experts.
12 °
Second, experienced entrepreneurs going into business in areas very
different from their prior venture were less likely to seek new information,
showing a degree of overconfidence.' 2' Third, the more confident122 the
entrepreneurs, the less likely they were to seek information, particularly
from professionals.12 3 The authors conclude that overconfidence leads
entrepreneurs to underappreciate the need to acquire information about
transactional hazards.1
24
Additionally, new entrepreneurs are more likely to be at an
informational disadvantage than are venture capitalists, given the newness
of the transactional environment 25  and of the relevant types of
information, 126 as well as their lack of prior contact with clients, financiers,
lawyers and other professionals. 27 They may not know what type of
showed interest in entrepreneurship found that 62.2% strongly agreed with the
proposition that as an entrepreneur you can better control outcomes in your life).20 Arnold C. Cooper et al., supra note 114, at 114-15. See also David Forlani &
John W. Mullins, Perceived Risks and Choices in Entrepreneurs'New Venture
Decisions, 15 J. Bus. VENTURING 305, 317 (2000) (concluding that more research
needs to be done to learn more about "how entrepreneurs search for and process
information about business situations and how such information processing
influences entrepreneurial behavior").
121 Cooper et al., supra note 114, at 115.
122 To test the level of optimism, the authors asked the subjects the following
questions: "What are the odds of your business succeeding? What are the odds of
any business like yours succeeding?" Id. at 112.Id. at 117.
124 The study did find that in larger, more complex ventures, the entrepreneurs did
seek some expert advice. Id. at 118.
125 Entrepreneurs usually have little experience in dealing with complex
transactional environments like the one that they are thrust into when they seek
venture capital funds. Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk. Some
Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated
Customers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 627, 637-41 (1996) (discussing various "cognitive
illusions" that may lead even sophisticated investors to purchase overly risky
securities, including the role of overconfidence in stock picking, social comparison
biases, and "loss framing," where an investor in a losing streak may decide that
further risk-taking is required to make up for the losses).
126 See Robert G. Lord & Karen J. Maher, Alternative Information-Processing
Models and Their Implications for Theory, Research & Practice, 15 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 9, 13-14 (1990).
127 See Ken G. Smith et al., Organizational Information Processing, Competitive
Responses, and Performance in the US. Domestic Airline Business, 34 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 60, 64 (1991) (arguing that managers with an external orientation,
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information to acquire or what questions to ask-in short, they may be
ignorant about the parameter of the problem that they are trying to solve.
Moreover, they have little experience dealing with complex contracts, such
as venture capital contracts.
12 8
While overoptimism may help an entrepreneur during the process of
innovation, it is a liability at the time of bargaining with venture capitalists.
Overoptimism can lead an entrepreneur to enter into contracts that do not
reflect the actual risks involved, including underestimating the probability
that the venture capitalist will act opportunistically. As the venture
progresses and the entrepreneur becomes more cognizant of the risks
associated with venture-capital contracts, one would expect her to engage in
the self-preserving strategic behavior discussed in Part II. In a sense,
venture-capitalist financed firms are much like a marriage, in that the
partners come to learn much about each other only after entering into the
transaction, and, as in marriage, there is always the possibility that a
divorce will ensue.
129
E. The Projection Bias: Background
At the time of agreeing to a transaction both the entrepreneur and
venture capitalist need to try to predict how their own preferences and that
of the other party may change over time. These predictions will affect the
parties' decision of whether to enter into a contract and, if so, what
provisions to include in it. A number of empirical studies have found that
individuals systematically mispredict how their preferences (and those of
others) will evolve over time. 13 That is, when individuals try to predict
outside experiences, are more efficient in gathering and processing a wider array of
information than are managers with an internal orientation).
128 This does not mean that all entrepreneurs will always find themselves in this
position, just that vis-A-vis the venture capitalists, they are more likely, given their
inexperience, to be at a cognitive disadvantage.
129 As Gary Becker puts it:
Several years of marriage is usually a far more effective source of
information on love and many other traits than all the other
proxies available prior to marriage. I suggest that marriages fail
early primarily because of imperfect information in marriage
markets and the accumulation of better information during
marriage. This suggestion is supported by the fact that
unexpected changes in earnings and health do raise the
probability of divorce.
GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 328 (1991).
130 For example, a study of the preferences of pregnant women regarding the use of
anesthesia during labor found that when the women were asked about their
preferences one month before labor, while they were in a cold psychological state,
they preferred not to use anesthesia; however, when they were in labor and in pain,
their preferences changed to wanting anesthesia. Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski,
Discount Functions and the Measurement of Patients' Values: Women's Decisions
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their future preferences, they tend to project their current preferences (as
influenced by the psychological states that they are in at the time) onto
those future preferences. This projection bias is particularly prominent
when people are in a "hot" psychological state either at the time when they
make an intertemporal decision or when they are called to follow through
with one of their past decisions. Hot psychological states include such
states as anger, hunger, fear, depression, jealousy, infatuation, curiosity,
anxiety, sleepiness, pain, sexual arousal and the craving of addictive
substances, such as drugs, alcohol and nicotine. 1
32
During Childbirth, 4 MED. DECISION MAKING 47, 50-53 (1984). Sexual arousal
can also lead to incorrect predictions regarding future preferences. See Ron S.
Gold, On the Need to Mind the Gap: On-Line Versus Off-Line Cognitions
Underlying Sexual Risk-Taking, in THE THEORY OF REASONED ACTION: ITS
APPLICATION TO AIDS-PREVENTIvE BEHAVIOR 227, 229-30 (Deborah J. Terry et
al. eds., 1993) (discussing discounting of future (remote) negative consequences of
unprotected sex when individuals are sexually aroused and face "an urgent desire
that demands immediate fulfillment"); George F. Loewenstein et al., The Effect of
Sexual Arousal on Expectations of Sexual Forcefulness, 34 J. RES. CRIME &
DELINQ. 443, 455-56 (1997) (describing study finding that male subjects who were
shown sexually arousing photographs were more likely to predict that they would
act sexually aggressively on date than those who were not shown arousing
photographs). There is evidence that individuals also tend to underestimate how
much they will crave drugs, alcohol, and nicotine when they are exposed to drug,
alcohol, and cigarette "cues." See generally David Laibson, A Cue-Theory of
Consumption, 116 Q.J. ECON. 81 (Feb. 2001) (discussing role of environmental
"cues" on habit-forming behavior such as smoking and addiction); George
Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 ORG. BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272, 272 (1996) [hereinafter Out of Control]
discussing role of hot states on drug addiction).
31 See George F. Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility,
118 Q.J. ECON. 1209, 1212-16 (Nov. 2003) [hereinafter Projection Bias]
(developing projection bias model to provide theoretical underpinning for evidence
on hot state decision-making). Under the projection bias model, an individual's
predictions of her future preferences will tend to lie somewhere in between the true
preferences that she will have in the future and her current preferences. Id. at 1210-
11.
132 See George Loewenstein & David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice? Predicting
Future Feelings, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY
85, 98 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999) (discussing "hot" states, such as anger,
hunger, pain, and sexual excitement). An individual may go from being in a cold
psychological state to being in a hot one when she experiences certain emotional or
biological triggers. See Out of Control, supra note 130, at 273 (discussing how
visceral factors are triggered by such factors as stimulation and deprivation). All of
these hot states and analogous ones share three important characteristics. First, they
are temporary or transient. Hot states do not last forever; eventually a person will
find herself back in a cold, unperturbed state, although, how long hot states last
may vary. Second, hot states focus the decision-maker's attention: they motivate
her, whether consciously or unconsciously, to act or refrain from acting. Hot states
may distract or intercept a decision-maker's deliberations, prod her to act without
giving much thought to the consequences, or take over complete control of the
reasoning process. Third, hot states are not isolated perturbations of our psyches;
they pervade the lives of individuals, they appear, disappear, and they recur. Id. at
274-75.
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For example, assume that an individual is to attend a meeting and has-to
order her lunch one week in advance. She can choose either the Spartan
one-course lunch or the gargantuan four-course one. In making this
decision, she should try to predict how hungry she will be the following
week without being influenced by whether, at the time of ordering, she
happened to be hungry or sated. However, a number of studies have found
that individuals suffer from a projection bias in such instances, 13 even
though being hungry or sated are feelings that individuals experience daily,
and which one would expect they would become better at predicting. 134
Two principal types of hot-state distortions can lead decisionmakers to
incorrectly predict their future preferences. First, a decisionmaker making
an intertemporal choice, while in a cold psychological state, will tend to
133A number of studies have found that individuals tend to project their current
level of hunger or satedness onto their predictions of how hungry or sated they
expect to be in future periods, as well as onto other related preferences. In one
study, individuals had to choose between fruit or junk food to be received in one
week. See generqlly Daniel Read & Barbara van Leeuwen, Predicting Hunger: The
Effects of Appetite and Delay on Choice, 76 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 189, 196-97 (1998). Some individuals made the choice while hungry,
others while sated. Id. The study found that a larger proportion of the hungry group
than the sated group chose the unhealthy junk food over the fruit. Id. at 197-98. In
another study, supermarket shoppers were asked before they went into the store to
make a shopping list of the items that they intended to purchase. Daniel T. Gilbert
et al., The Future is Now: Temporal Correction in Affective Forecasting, 88 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 430, 437-38 (2002). Some shoppers were
given a muffin to eat before shopping (the sated group) while other shoppers were
not given a muffin (the hungry group). Id. at 438. Shoppers who did not eat a
muffin before entering the store purchased a larger proportion of unplanned items
(items not on their shopping list) than shoppers in the sated group. Id. at 439. The
result held true independently of whether or not the shoppers were allowed to take
the shopping list into the store. Id. Shopping lists, however, may act as a sort of
self-regulation mechanism. See Russell Abratt & Stephen Donald Goodey,
Unplanned Buying and In-Store Stimuli in Supermarkets, 11 MANAGERIAL &
DECISION ECON. 117-18 (1990) (presenting study of supermarket shoppers with
and without shopping lists; shoppers without shopping lists claimed that twenty-
five percent of their purchases were unplanned, while shoppers with shopping lists
claimed that only sixteen percent of their purchases were unplanned).
1 While one would expect that repeated exposure to the same or analogous hot
states will lead to a learning effect, the evidence suggests otherwise. See Jay J.J.
Christensen-Szalanski, Discount Functions and the Measurement of Patients'
Values: Women's Decisions During Childbirth, 4 MED. DECISION MAKING 47, 51
(1984) (finding that pregnant women who mispredicted that their preferences
regarding anesthesia would change when in active labor, again mispredicted when
asked month after labor); Leaf Van Boven et al., Mispredicting the Endowment
Effect: Underestimation of Owner ' Selling Prices by Buyer's Agents, 51 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 351, 362-63 (2003) (discussing learning limitations in
endowment-effect projection bias). Moreover, even though some individuals are
aware at some level that they will experience a projection bias in the future, when
they are in the midst of hot states they once again succumb to the bias. See also
Loewenstein, Projection Bias, supra note 131, at 1215 (illustrating example of folk
wisdom to "never shop on an empty stomach" as evidence of awareness of
projection bias).
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underappreciate the full magnitude of changes in her preferences caused by
future hot states.' 35 Second, a "decisionmaker making an intertemporal
choice, while in a hot psychological state, will tend to mispredict how long
the hot state will last 136 and how different she will feel in the future when
she is back in a cold state; this is true even though the decision-maker
knows that the hot state is transient in nature and will eventually come to an
end.' 37 Importantly, the claim is not that individuals do not know that they
are experiencing potentially transient feelings, although if they are in the
midst of a visceral state of high enough intensity-for example,
infatuation-they may not be fully cognizant of it. Instead, the problem is
that while individuals may fully understand that going from cold states to
hot ones, or vice versa, will have some effect on their preferences, they still
tend to underappreciate by how much their preferences will change. 38
Finally, individuals trying to predict the preferences of others tend to
utilize their own preferences in making those predictions. 39 For example,
an individual in a cold state trying to predict the hot state preferences of
another individual will first try to predict the preferences that she herself
would have if she were the one in the hot state. She would then use those
intrapersonal predictions to make her interpersonal predictions of the hot-
state preferences of the other individual. 40 Therefore, if that individual's
predictions about her own preferences are subject to the projection bias, her
predictions about the other person's preferences, which are based on her
faulty intrapersonal predictions, will tend to be affected by the bias. A
number of studies' have found that individuals project their own projection
bias onto others in this fashion.14' One would expect that this interpersonal
135 See Out of Control, supra note 130, at 281 (arguing that individuals tend to
underestimate impact of hot states on their future actions).
136 Individuals tend to incorrectly predict how long certain feelings will last, even
though they experience those feeling repeatedly. See Timothy D. Wilson et al.,
Lessons from the Past: Do People Learn from Experience That Emotional
Reactions are Short-Lived?, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1648
12001).
37 See Projection Bias, supra note 134, at 1228-29 (discussing irreversible
decisions made by individuals while in hot states, believing incorrectly that hot
states would persist for longer periods).
138 Id. at 1210 (stating that under projection bias model, decision-maker correctly
predicts direction of her changes in preferences, but underappreciates full
magnitude of those changes).
139 For a discussion of studies finding interpersonal projections, see Stephen J.
Hoch, Perceived Consensus and Predictive Accuracy: The Pros and Cons of
Projection, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 221, 223-24 (1987).
140 See Out of Control, supra note 130, at 284.141 See Leaf Van Boven et al., Mispredicting the Endowment Effect:
Underestimation of Owners' Selling Prices by Buyer's Agents, 51 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 351, 363 (2003) (discussing findings that party's biased predictions (due to
projection bias) "will lead them to make biased predictions of other people's
preferences"); Leaf Van Boven et al., Egocentric Empathy Gaps Between Owners
and Buyers: Misperceptions of the Endowment Effect, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 66, 72-73 (2000) [hereinafter Egocentric] (finding that projection bias
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projection of the projection bias is particularly important when individuals
interact in transactional contexts.
142
F. The Projection Bias and the Venture Capital Contracting Process
When an entrepreneur bargains over the terms of a venture capitalist's
investments and the contracts that will govern their relationship, she will
need to predict how her preferences and those of the venture capitalist may
change over time. At the start of the venture, the entrepreneur and venture
capitalist are in a cold psychological state. In predicting the extent to which
their preferences may change during future hot states, the entrepreneur will
tend to give added weight to her cold-state preferences. According to the
projection bias, this will lead her to underappreciate the full magnitude of
her own and the venture capitalist's temptation to act opportunistically in
future hot states. This will lead entrepreneurs to underappreciate the extent
to which they need to bargain for contractual provisions to address these
future hot-state temptations. More generally, the projection bias can lead
contracting parties to leave their contracts more incomplete than they would
if they were able to make more accurate predictions of how hot states can
distort their current and future preferences. However, given that venture
capitalists use standardized contracts, it is the entrepreneur who is most
likely to be harmed by the projection bias.
While an entrepreneur will obviously want to determine what
contractual provisions are needed to constrain the future actions of the
venture capitalist, there are two reasons why an entrepreneur may also want
to enter into self-regulation contracts to restrict her own ability to act in
future hot states. 143 First, an entrepreneur may want to prevent her future
affects interpersonal predictions in context of under-appreciation of endowment
effect); Leaf Van Boven & George Loewenstein, Social Projection of Transient
Drive States, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1159, 1165 (2003) (finding
that projection bias affects interpersonal predictions in the context of feelings of
hunger, thirst, and warmth).
142 See Egocentric, supra note 141, at 66 (arguing that incorrect predictions by
buyers and sellers regarding full magnitude of endowment effect can lead to value-
maximizing transactions not getting done).
143 Generally, any attempt to bridge the gap between our perceived interests and our
actual behavior, to override the urge or temptation posed by self-control problems,
is an effort at "self-regulation." See George Ainslie, The Dangers of Willpower, in
GET7ING HOOKED: RATIONALITY AND ADDICTION 65, 67-68 (Jon Elster & Ole-
Jorgen Skog eds., 1999); RoY F. BAUMEISTER ET AL., LOSING CONTROL: How AND
WHY PEOPLE FAIL AT SELF-REGULATION 6-7 (1994) (describing ability among
human beings "to exert control over one's own inner states, processes, and
responses" and defining self-regulation as "any effort by a human being to alter its
own responses" so as to override push to act in ways that diverge from what they
really want and describing the interplay of preferences over conflicting rewards).
The term "self-regulation" can be used broadly to include not only an individual's
attempt to regulate his own self-control problems, but also the self-control
problems of others. It is possible to envision scenarios in which one party enters
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selves from taking hot-state actions that lead to retaliatory or other tit-for-
tat reactions by the venture capitalist. Provoking such reactions can make
both parties worse off. Second, at the time of forming the venture, an
entrepreneur may have strict preferences to avoid taking hot-state actions
that undermine other goals. For example, an entrepreneur may want to
avoid opportunistic behavior that undermines her personal moral code or
that threatens the survival of the venture.
Finally, the overall efficiency of venture investing is closely tied to the
fundraising environment faced by venture capitalists-i.e. whether they are
in a boom period, when a lot of funds are flowing into venture capital
partnerships or one in which institutions are far more reticent.' 44 In boom
periods, when "too much money is chasing too few deals," valuations tend
to go up due to the competition between venture capitalists to find
investments in a limited number of start-ups.145 Because of the options
feature of staged investing, one would expect that during boom periods
venture capitalists would have an incentive to commit funds without
thoroughly screening entrepreneurs, and to make as many investments as
possible, waiting until later to decide whether to exercise their option to
invest in a second stage. The projection bias and hot psychological states
can help explain some of the over-entry and boom-bust cycles observed in
recent years. Even if venture capitalists and their investors know that they
are overinvesting due to hot psychological states fueled by hot IPO and
merger markets, the projection bias tells us that they will tend to mispredict
the full magnitude of their distortion.
G. Time-Inconsistent Preferences and Venture Capital Contracts
Standard economic models assume that actors have time-consistent
preferences, in the sense that they do not experience systematic self-control
problems solely due to the fact that they give added weight to immediate
gratification. But there is a large body of empirical evidence showing that
people routinely exhibit time-inconsistent preferences, because of a short-
term preference for immediate gratification that leads them to override their
into a contract aimed at addressing the potential opportunistic behavior of the other
party, where the opportunistic behavior can be the result of a calculated action, or
due to self-control problems, such as hot-state actions. It is useful in designing
contracts and legal rules to clearly. identify the sources of the behavior to be
regulated, since dealing with self-control problems require different approaches.
14'GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 7, at 135. See also Paul Gompers & Josh
Lerner, The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Partnership
Agreements, 39 J. L. & EcoN. 463, 464 (1996) (finding, analogously, that when
venture capitalist are in too much demand, investors in venture capital limited
partnerships require less stringent contractual covenants).5 Paul A Gompers, The Rise and Fall of Venture Capital, 23 Bus. & ECON. HIST.
1, 10 (1994) (looking at venture capital boom in the late 1960s followed by a bust
in the 1970s); Willliam A. Sahlman & Howard Stevenson, Capital Market Myopia,
1 J. Bus. VENTURING 7, 20-21 (1986).
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long-term preferences. It is this asymmetry between long-term and short-
term impatience that leads people to procrastinate and over-consume.1
46
This section argues that time-inconsistent preferences can lead to inefficient
contracting decisions by both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. In
particular, it argues that time-inconsistent preferences can affect the
decisions of entrepreneurs when they are searching for a potential venture
capitalist to invest in their venture, deciding how much information to
acquire regarding potential transactional risks, and negotiating with venture
capitalists over the contracts that will govern their relationship. When
combined, these three distortions in the contracting decisions of time-
inconsistent entrepreneurs can lead them to enter into contracts that are sub-
optimal, at least when compared with the types of contracts predicted
standard venture capital models, which assume that entrepreneurs have
time-consistent preferences.
1. Procrastination and Overconsumption in Connection with the
Search for Funding
An entrepreneur that has decided to bring in a venture capitalist as an
investor will still need to incur costs to find a venture capitalist who is
willing to invest and that is a good fit. Searching for potential investors
imposes an immediate cost on the entrepreneur; the higher these cost the
more likely that an entrepreneur will procrastinate trying to secure funding
from venture capitalists. At the same time, when the entrepreneurial market
is "hot" in the sense that there are a lot of potentially viable start-ups,
venture capitalists will actively seek out entrepreneurs and offer them a
large amount of money up front. While this two prong strategy makes
perfect sense, even if all entrepreneurs had time-consistent preferences, it is
likely to be particularly effective with time-inconsistent entrepreneurs.
By actively seeking out entrepreneurs, a venture capitalist lowers the
immediate search costs that they must incur to find funding, thereby
reducing their incentive to procrastinate. Moreover, by offering a time-
inconsistent entrepreneur an immediate reward-a large, up-front cash
146 Importantly, economists.embraced exponential discounting because it made
their models more tractable mathematically, not because they believed that real-
world actors use exponential functions. See GARY S. BECKER, ACCbUNTING FOR
TASTES 11 (1996) ("The assumption of consistent preferences is clearly not a literal
description of much actual behavior ... but it is an extremely useful simplification
of behavior."). Unlike the large body of evidence supporting the time-inconsistency
assumption, there is no systematic evidence finding that people have constant
discount rates. See Warren K. Bickel & Matthew W. Johnson, Delay Discounting:
A Fundamental Behavioral Process of Drug Dependence, in TIME AND DECISION:
ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 419,
422 (George Loewenstein et al. eds. 2003) (stating that "[e]xponential discounting.
. has not been empirically supported by behavioral research" conducted in humans
and animals).
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infusion-venture capitalists increase the likelihood that the entrepreneur
will end the search sooner than she would if she had time-consistent
preferences. It can also lead to over-entry by under-qualified entrepreneurs
and the formation of ventures that have little likelihood of succeeding.
147
This can lead to a distortion in the market for innovations, as experienced
workers leave established firms and form start-ups, only to have fragile
start-ups fail. Of course, some of the innovations will eventually find
themselves back into the hands of established firms.
2. Procrastination Incurring Transaction Costs in Connection with
the Contracting Process
Transacting parties acquire information in order to become aware of
transactional hazards so that they can protect themselves via contracts or
discounting. An entrepreneur will need to determine how much information
to acquire about the talents and experience of the venture capitalist, and
whether it is trustworthy or an opportunist. Most types of information are
investment goods: a party must incur an immediate cost to search for,
acquire, and process the information; however, the benefits from using it
materialize over time. This means that time-inconsistent entrepreneurs will
have an incentive to procrastinate acquiring information about transactional
hazards.
48
Entrepreneurs will also have an incentive to procrastinate acquiring a
second type of information relevant to their decision about whether or not
to enter into a transaction with a venture capitalist: self-evaluative
information about their own abilities. Self-evaluative information imposes
two types of immediate costs, those of acquiring and processing it and the
costs associated with learning negative things about one's self. This can
lead time-inconsistent entrepreneurs to refuse this sort of information, even
147A party's over optimism regarding the venture's prospects and her own abilities
can also lead to over-entry and the formation of nonviable businesses. See Colin
Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental
Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306, 314-15 (1999) (finding that when entrants
believed that their post-entry payoffs would depend on their abilities or skill, they
tended to be overoptimistic about their chances of success, as compared to subjects
whose payoffs from entry would not depend on skill, leading to over-entry).
148 O'Donoghue and Rabin argue that since "information gathering itself is likely to
be onerous-and create immediate costs-people with self-control problems may
be prone to put off incurring these costs." Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Self
Awareness and Self Control, in TIME AND DECISION: ECONOMIC AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 217, 236 (George
Loewenstein et al. eds. 2003). The incentive to procrastinate in acquiring
information also implies that individuals, in choosing between different types of
information to acquire "may be biased towards information that is less onerous to
acquire." Id. In other words, a party with present-biased preferences will have an
incentive to choose the information source that provides the lowest relative
immediate cost in return for acquiring the same delayed benefit.
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if it were provided to them for free. 14 9 Procrastination in acquiring self-
evaluative information can help explain the empirical studies regarding
entrepreneurial overoptimism discussed above.' 50 One would expect that
time-inconsistent entrepreneurs are more likely to enter into standard
venture capital contracts without seeking to amend them. The immediate
costs of bargaining over contract provision include the costs acquiring and
processing information discussed above, as well as other transaction costs,
such as time and effort.5 ' and legal fees.
3. Procrastination Disclosing Information to Venture Capitalists
As we have seen, entrepreneurs will have an incentive to delay
transferring information to venture capitalists. This problem is exacerbated
to the extent that the venture capitalist can impose an immediate
punishment on the entrepreneur, and the latter has time-inconsistent
preferences. In such a case, even an entrepreneur who, from a long-term
perspective, believes that she will be better off transferring the information
immediately will have an incentive to procrastinate whenever the
immediate penalty is sufficiently great. More generally, the entrepreneur
will procrastinate disclosing information to the venture capitalist whenever
the immediate costs of doing so are greater than the loss from a one period
delay. To the extent that the venture capitalist values the information for
reasons other than its use in disciplining the entrepreneur, it can deal with
the procrastination problem by agreeing not to use the information against
her.
149 Economic actors may engage in such "strategic ignorance" aimed at preserving
their current levels of self-confidence. Ronald B6nabou & Jean Tirole, Self-
Knowledge and Self-Regulation: An Economic Approach, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
ECONOMIC DECISIONS 137, 144 (2003). As Baumeister states: "Given the powerful
motivation to think well of oneself, it is necessary to ask how people manage to
maintain such self-flattering views in the face of mixed and even contrary
evidence." Roy F. Baumeister, The Self, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 680, 690 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds. 1998).150 See infra Part III.F. (summarizing literature on entrepreneurial overoptimism).
151 The exertion of effort is one of the most "invisible" but critical immediate costs
that leads individuals to procrastinate following through with a task that they have
a long-term preference to perform. Effort not only includes physical exertion, but
also mental exertion. This means, among other things, that time-inconsistent
preferences are an important cause of bounded rationality that has been overlooked
by commentators. Individuals: who do not face computational limits may
nevertheless appear to have bounded rationality because the immediate costs of
exerting mental efforts are large enough to cause individuals to repeatedly
procrastinate processing the relevant information. Concluding that the failure to
fully process information required for making rational decisions is due to mere
computational boundaries can lead to mistaken approaches to dealing with the
bounded rationality of decisionmakers.
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4. Procrastination by Venture Capitalists in Screening
Entrepreneurs
The venture capital literature places a lot of weight on the rationality of
venture capitalists. It is assumed that they act rationally when exercising
control over portfolio companies and deploying and enforcing incentive
mechanisms. However, venture capitalists with time-inconsistent
preferences may procrastinate carrying out these tasks. Moreover, given
that identifying potential investments and carrying out the requisite due
diligence requires a venture capitalist to incur immediate costs, venture
capitalists may under-invest in these activities and thus enter into fewer
agreements with start-up companies than would a time-consistent venture
capitalist. A venture capitalist may also put off incurring the immediate
costs of determining whether an entrepreneur is likely to have the ability to
become an effective manager. The managerial skills of entrepreneurs tend
to become important at later points in the venture, as the firm grows in size
or plans an initial public offering and as we have seen venture capitalists
can easily dismiss entrepreneurs who fail to acquire the requisite skills.152 A
venture capitalist may thus procrastinate acquiring this evaluative
information about entrepreneurs which in turn can lead to over-entry by
entrepreneurs with little managerial abilities.
Certain provisions in the standard limited partnership agreement
between a venture capitalist and its investors can be interpreted as
commitment devices. For example, the agreement includes a deadline for
making investments-three to four years-and harvesting them-six to
seven years. Additionally, the investments of the limited partnerships will
be in stages; although it is up to the venture capitalist to decide on
drawdown requests, it will have to provide sufficient justification to prevent
a supermajority of the investors from deciding to replace it with another
general partner. Finally, the norm in the venture capital industry of staging
investments acts as a commitment device for venture capitalists. While the
venture capitalist may have some leeway in deciding when to fund a
subsequent stage, it will have one clear-cut deadline: the "bum date" when
the venture runs out of funds.
152 As we have seen, venture capitalists generally assume that entrepreneurs will be
unable to make the transition to capable managers and that they will eventually
have to fire entrepreneurs and replace them with professional managers. See Gary
E. Willard et al., In Order to Grow, Must the Founder Go: A Comparison of
Performance Between Founder and Non-Founder Managed High-Growth
Manufacturing Firms, 7 J. BUS. VENTURING 181, 182 (1992).
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IV. ADDRESSING THE MISINCENTIVES IN VENTURE CAPITAL
CONTRACTS VIA JUDICIAL ENGINEERING
As we saw in Part II, venture capital contracts are long-term contracts
that are by nature incomplete. Courts, therefore, will inevitably be called
upon to fill in gaps, interpret vague provisions and provide default rules.
This section explores some potential judicial reactions to the types of
conflicts that arise in connection with two facets of the relationship between
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs: the employer/employee and
majority/minority shareholder relationships.
A. Some Remedies For the "Founder's Disease" Mentality
One way of dealing with the misincentives created by the "founder's
disease" mentality of venture capitalists is for courts to allow entrepreneurs
to use the remedy of dissolution for "oppression" in certain cases, such as
when they are fired at a time when the venture is profitable. This default
will provide venture capitalists with an incentive to directly address the
problem at the time of contracting. In some jurisdictions, such a remedy is
already available to entrepreneurs: the violation of a minority shareholder's
"reasonable expectations" to continue in the firm's employ and as a
shareholder constitutes grounds for dissolution due to "oppression" by the
majority shareholder.153
Courts can also address the problem by narrowly interpreting the "for
cause" termination provisions in employment contracts, allowing
entrepreneurs greater leeway to bring lawsuits for tortious interference in
connection with the firing, and narrowly construing a venture capitalist's
defense of "economic justification." In Foster v. Churchill, the plaintiffs
succeeded on their claim that the defendants violated the "for cause"
provisions in their contracts (although they lost the case for other
reasons). 54 In Foster, two founders fired by their firm sued the venture
capitalists financing the firm for tortious interference.'55 The founders were
fired "for cause," but the trial court found that none of the reasons given for
the firing came under the "for cause" provision of the contract. 56 Thus, the
court concluded that the business judgment rule did not protect the venture
capitalists, given that they "failed to treat appellants with the utmost good
faith required of them" when they prompted the firm to fire them "for
cause." 57 The court did, however, conclude that the venture capitalists were
153 See, e.g., O'Donnel v. Marine Repair Services Inc., 530 F. Supp. 1199 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984); In re Topper,
433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
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protected by the defense of economic justification.18 While such cases will
necessarily be fact specific, given the potential for venture capitalist
opportunism described above and the resulting repercussions, courts should
be wary of claims of firing "for cause" and should construe the defense of
"economic justification" narrowly.
C
B. Tying the Hands of Venture Capitalists with Well-Tailored Fiduciary
Duties: Donahue Meets Sinclair
Venture capitalists control the venture and thus owe a fiduciary duty to
the minority shareholder, the entrepreneur. Notwithstanding Cardozo's
"unbending" rhetoric in Meinhard v. Salmon, it is quite obvious that
fiduciary duties are rigid (in theory), pliable (in application) and vague (in
prescription). While this makes planning and anticipation by the parties, in
some senses, more difficult, the judge's task more demanding, and the risk
of error greater, the imposition of strong fiduciary duties is the best elixir
against self-dealing and opportunistic behavior. Having strong fiduciary
duties allows the venture capitalist to credibly pre-commit not to act
opportunistically-they allow the venture capitalist to tie its hands.' 59
In closed corporations such as the start-ups financed by venture
capitalists, the fiduciary duty owed by a majority or controlling shareholder
is usually greater than that owed by a majority shareholder in a public
corporation. The strength of the fiduciary obligation will vary from
jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction. At one end of the spectrum is the strict fiduciary
duty set forth in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype.1 60 In Donahue, the court
applied a "strict good faith" standard of loyalty, holding that a closed
corporation "bears striking resemblance to a partnership," and, thus "[j]ust
as in a partnership, the relationship among the stockholders must be one of
trust, confidence, and absolute loyalty if the enterprise is to succeed." The
court in Donahue rested its decision partly on the fact that "[d]isloyalty and
self-seeking conduct on the part of any stockholder will engender bickering,
corporate stalemates, and perhaps efforts to achieve dissolutions.''
This, of course is a very important concern in venture-capital-financed
start-ups since the probability of failure is already high. However, the fact
that venture capitalists hold interests in a portfolio of companies means that
the fiduciary duty cannot be set too strict. For example, there is a high
158 The Appellate Division affirmed, but found that the business judgment rule did
apply because Delaware law governed. 215 A.D. 155 (N.Y.A.D. 1995). The Court
of Appeal affirmed the finding for defendants, holding that the defense of
economic justification succeeded, since the firm was in economic distress and the
defendants were not motivated by malice or employed illegal. It did not reach the
issue of the application of the business judgment rule. Foster, 665 N.E.2d 153.
159 This, of course, will depend on enforcement costs.
160 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
161 Id.
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likelihood that some of the companies in a venture capitalist's portfolio are
in the same or similar lines of business, and are or may become competitors
in the future. This is because venture capitalists tend to specialize in certain
industries and geographic areas. Furthermore, a venture capitalist will have
to allocate time among the different portfolio companies.
The fiduciary duty rule applicable to majority shareholders in public
corporations is more lenient.162 It distinguishes between situations where
both the majority shareholder and the minority shareholders receive a
benefit (for example, the payment of a dividend), and situations where the
majority receives a benefit that the minority does not receive. 16 3 In the first
situation (the equal-treatment case), courts give the majority shareholder the
benefit of the business judgment rule, while in the second situation
(discriminatory treatment), courts impose a duty of loyalty. Such a rule,
however, is by itself unlikely to be sufficiently restrictive to deter venture
capitalist opportunism. In deciding whether to give the venture capitalist the
benefit of the business judgment rule (as was done by the New York
Supreme Court (Appellate Division), in Foster'64), courts should be
sensitive to the contractual hazards faced by entrepreneurs and the
ammunition those hazards provide for potential venture capitalist
opportunism. Of course, the types of companies and transaction-specific
investments involved, and the specific nature of the venture capitalist-
entrepreneur relationship need to be taken into account and properly
weighed in each case.
V. CONCLUSION
Venture capital contracts include a number of provisions meant to
address the informational asymmetry between venture capitalists and
entrepreneurs and deter the latter from acting opportunistically. These
contracts give venture capitalists overwhelming ex post bargaining power
and thus the ability to act opportunistically, but do not completely
extinguish the bargaining power of entrepreneurs. This Article argues that
entrepreneurs will have an incentive to use their ex post bargaining power
to protect themselves from venture capitalist opportunism and the
consequences from the non-opportunistic operation of provisions in venture
capital contracts. This self-preserving strategic behavior of entrepreneurs is
socially wasteful and at an extreme can lead to the failure of otherwise
viable firms. From a social welfare maximizing perspective, the optimal
162 See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515-16 (drawing a distinction between the
fiduciary duty that shareholders in a closed corporation owe each other and the
"somewhat less stringent standard of fiduciary duty to which directors and
shareholders of all corporations must adhere").
163 See Sinclair v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
164 See Foster v. Churchill, 665 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1996). But see trial court opinion
in Foster-business judgment rule did not apply. Id. at 157.
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contract would reduce the sum of the welfare losses from venture capitalist
opportunism and the self-preserving strategic behavior of entrepreneurs.
This Article examines the tradeoff between these two types of socially
wasteful behavior and in doing so identifies a number of misincentives
created by standard venture capital contracts. The Article also identifies a
set of roadblocks to the emergence of optimal venture capital contracts.
While venture capital contracts have been studied in great depth,
commentators have largely overlooked the set of misincentives and
bargaining obstacles identified in this Article.
